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“Without education, you’re not going anywhere in this world.”
— Malcolm X
“Much of one’s inability to know racial discrimination when one sees it
results from a failure to recognize that racism is both a crime and a disease.
This failure is compounded by a reluctance to admit that the illness of
racism infects almost everyone. Acknowledging and understanding the
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malignancy are prerequisites to the discovery of an appropriate cure. But
the diagnosis is difficult, because our own contamination with the very
illness for which a cure is sought impairs our comprehension of the
disorder.”
— Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 19861987, 321.

INTRODUCTION
Since its formal establishment in 1993, the European Union (“EU”) has
built a reputation as an upholder of human rights, distancing itself from the
racism that nearly destroyed the continent in the 1930s and 40s. In today’s
Europe, however, racism is in fact still alive and well. In particular, the
Roma, Europe’s largest minority, continue to face shocking levels of
discrimination.
The Roma have been discriminated against throughout their history. In
Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Western Europe, Roma are
discriminated against in all facets of life, including in education,
employment, and health care. This discrimination is most pronounced in
Central and Eastern Europe due to the large Roma minority in many of the
countries in the region. Some of the most intense discrimination involves
Roma children who are frequently segregated from non-Roma students in
schools throughout Central and Eastern Europe. While not legally
institutionalized, the segregation of Roma children is comparable to that
experienced by African American children in the United States throughout
the 1950s and 60s.
This article focuses on the failure of anti-discrimination measures, both
at the national and at the EU level, to substantively reduce discrimination
against Roma children in education. Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) provides
the necessary context for understanding why the European Union and its
individual member states continue to fail in this respect, despite numerous
national and supranational measures aimed specifically at the Roma. The
first section of this article provides a brief background on the Roma and the
pervasive discrimination they have faced over the centuries. The second
section provides an overview of CRT and discusses its relevance to the study
of segregation of Roma in education, comparing the situation of the Roma
in Europe with the African American population in the United States. The
third section describes how existing anti-discrimination measures in the
European Union and at the national level within EU Member States are
inadequate as currently enforced, due to issues of systemic discrimination.
Finally, the article concludes by offering several suggestions to combat
segregation across Europe using existing legal tools. In particular, impact
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litigation at the local and national levels can be a critical tool in using the
judicial system to effect change and must play a prominent role in addressing
the segregation of Roma children.
I. THE ROMA IN EUROPE
Much has been written about the Roma, their origins, and the historical
discrimination they have faced wherever they reside.1 This article presents
an abbreviated and simplified overview in order to enable readers unfamiliar
with the Roma to comprehend the scope and intensity of the discrimination
they face, particularly in education, employment and public health. Roma
children face discrimination in the form of school segregation across much
of Central and Eastern Europe.
The Roma are Europe’s largest minority, with an estimated population
between ten and twelve million throughout greater Europe,2 and over six
million in the European Union alone.3 Around seventy percent of the total
European Roma population is concentrated in Central and Southeastern
Europe.4 The Roma population is estimated at roughly ten percent of the total
population in Bulgaria, nearly nine percent in Romania, nine percent in
Slovakia and seven and one-half percent in Hungary.5 Accurate population
data is difficult to obtain in large part because of reluctance of Roma to selfidentify for fear of repercussions; the number of individuals who selfidentify as Roma is far lower than official estimates.
Originally from India, the Roma migrated westward to Europe
somewhere between 500 and 1000 A.D., reaching Europe around the
thirteenth century.6 From the moment they arrived in Europe, the Roma were
viewed with suspicion by native populations. Many Roma were enslaved in
1. See generally, e.g., ZOLTAN BARANY, THE EAST EUROPEAN GYPSIES: REGIME CHANGE,
MARGINALITY, AND ETHNOPOLITICS (2002); KONRAD BERCOVICI, THE STORY OF THE GYPSIES (1928);
DAVID M. CROWE, A HISTORY OF THE GYPSIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (2d ed. 2007); ANGUS
FRASER, THE GYPSIES (2d ed. 1995).
2. Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies,
at 12, COM (2014) 209 final (Apr. 2, 2014).
3. NIALL CROWLEY ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, EMPOWERMENT OF ROMA WOMEN WITHIN
THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL ROMA INCLUSION STRATEGIES 15 (2013).
4. GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE RIGHT OF ROMA CHILDREN TO EDUCATION: POSITION
PAPER 15 (2011). A 2011 UNICEF position paper estimated the population at a relatively conservative
ten million. Id. The Council of Europe estimates the population at six to sixteen million in all of Europe
based on population data from July 2012. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ESTIMATES AND OFFICIAL NUMBERS OF
ROMA IN EUROPE (2012), http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/roma [https://perma.cc/PG34-8BKM]. The
number of officially self-identified Roma in contrast is under two million. Id.
5. ESTIMATES AND OFFICIAL NUMBERS OF ROMA IN EUROPE, supra note 4.
6. HELEN O’NIONS, MINORITY RIGHTS PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ROMA OF
EUROPE 3 (2007).
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what is today’s Romania beginning in the thirteenth or fourteenth century
and some remained enslaved until the mid-nineteenth century.7 In many
European countries, laws were passed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
expelling the Roma; in several countries, Roma were sentenced to death if
found.8
The Roma were historically nomadic, working as metalworkers, horse
breeders, horse trainers, musicians and in other traditional skilled
occupations.9 Today, most are no longer itinerant, although the stereotype of
the nomadic wanderer lingers in mainstream consciousness.10 In
understanding their historical position in Europe, scholars have argued that
the Roma are best viewed as pariah people.11 The great sociologist Max
Weber famously defined the situation of pariah people as one where “the
people in question have totally lost their residential anchorage and hence are
completely occupied economically in meeting [the] demands of other settled
peoples—the gypsies, for instance, or, in another manner, the Jews of the
Middle Ages.”12 As pariah people, the absence of residential anchorage, as
described by Weber, has often left the Roma vulnerable to persecution and
reliant on the goodwill of the populations around them.13 István Pogány
argues that this lack of residential anchorage has also contributed to the
Roma’s general failure to develop effective forms of political
organizations.14 Pogány further argues that contrary to Weber’s thesis, which
was based on the idea of ritual separation often maintained and enforced by
the pariah peoples themselves, modern separation of Roma from non-Roma
is largely a result of anti-Romaism in Central and Eastern European countries
that has replaced the ritual separation Weber originally identified.15

7. See Elena Marushiakova & Vesselin Popov, Gypsy Slavery in Wallachia and Moldavia, in
NATIONALISMS TODAY 89–123 (Tomasz Kamusella & Krzysztof Jaskułowski eds., 2009).
8. Donald Kenrick, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE GYPSIES (ROMANIES) xx-xxii (Jon
Woronoff ed., 2d ed. 2007).
9. István Pogány, Pariah Peoples: Roma and the Multiple Failures of Law in Central and Eastern
Europe, 21 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 375, 378 (2012).
10. See Nicolae Gheorghe, Choices to be Made and Prices to be Paid: Potential Roles and
Consequences in Roma Activism and Policy-Making, in FROM VICTIMHOOD TO CITIZENSHIP: THE PATH
OF ROMA INTEGRATION: A DEBATE 41, 73 (Will Guy ed. 2013) (arguing that it is not acceptable to use
the mythology of the nomadic Roma to “promote images of the Roma as ‘eternal nomads’, ‘children of
the wind’, ‘people without a state’, or ‘stateless, uprooted, true Europeans’” since most Roma are settled
and are citizens of their respective countries.
11. See Pogány, supra note 9, at 379.
12. MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF INDIA 13 (1958), quoted in Pogány, supra note 9, at 377.
13. Pogány, supra note 9, at 379.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 389.
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As a result of their wanderings, the Roma borrowed certain elements
from the societies around them while retaining their distinct cultural identity.
Among the cultural acquisitions were religious beliefs and language. This
has resulted in a European Roma minority that is far from monolithic; the
Roma’s fragmentation often seems to override their commonalities, making
a unified Roma civil rights movement difficult to achieve. For instance,
Romani, the Roma language, is only spoken by a minority of Roma in
Central Europe,16 while a majority continues to speak it in Southeastern
Europe.17
The Roma are a physically visible racial minority throughout much of
Europe. In Southeastern Europe, however, linguistic differences rather than
differences in skin color most distinguish the Roma from non-Roma.18 This
combination of race and ethnicity requires a nuanced approach to
understanding the place of Roma in European society. As Lilla Farkas writes,
Treating Roma simply as a racial minority on account of their skin colour
would deny their historical presence in and ties to Member States, and
with this, their protection as an ethnic minority. Conversely, treating them
only as an ethnic minority would deny protection on account of their skin
colour, which distinguishes them from the majority of ethnic minorities
indigenous in Member States and which is a characteristic that may
exaggerate the extent of discrimination they suffer. 19

The distinction between racial and ethnic identities is discussed in
greater detail below. It is the Roma’s racial identity, however, that has most
profoundly influenced the level of discrimination they face in Central and
Eastern Europe.
A high rate of illiteracy—both at present and historically—stands out
among the challenges facing the Roma and has directly affected the group’s
educational achievement. Illiteracy has had significant implications both in
the contemporary employment arena as well as in the creation of a unified
Roma identity. Literacy is a requirement for most contemporary jobs.
Additionally, as a traditionally non-literate minority, the Roma have never
shaped historical narratives, unlike societies with written cultures that have
left records of their experiences and accomplishments.20 As a result, where

16. Martin Kovats, Integration and the Politicisation of Roma Identity, in FROM VICTIMHOOD TO
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 10, at 108.
17. Dieter W. Halwachs, Affiliation, Varieties, Speakers, in ROMANI IN EUROPE 5 (2003).
18. Interview with Tefik Mahmut, European Roma Rights Centre, in Budapest, Hungary (June 16,
2015).
19. LILLA FARKAS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SEGREGATION OF ROMA CHILDREN IN EDUCATION:
ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION THROUGH THE RACE EQUALITY DIRECTIVE 19 (2007).
20. See András Bíró, The Price of Roma Integration, in FROM VICTIMHOOD TO CITIZENSHIP, supra
note 10, at 16.
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oral traditions have been lost, the Roma are left only with non-Roma versions
of their identity; versions that speak of thieves, fortune tellers, baby
snatching, and other negative stereotypes. Thus, illiteracy has impaired the
Roma’s efforts to obtain permanent employment and has left little historical
record to facilitate the creation of a modern Roma identity.
One of the most pressing challenges for the Roma in contemporary
society is an extremely high rate of unemployment, due largely to society’s
unwillingness to hire Roma employees, but also in part to the Roma’s lack
of educational achievement in an economic milieu that increasingly requires
educational certifications. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, rates of
Roma unemployment have been estimated as high as eighty percent21
(although this does not take into account the grey economy, where many
Roma work unofficially). Similarly, “in Bulgaria, between sixty and eighty
percent of the [Roma population] suffers permanent unemployment,” and
nearly eighty percent of Roma in Bulgaria and Romania live on less than five
dollars per day.22 Before the collapse of Communism in 1989–1990,
unemployment was virtually nonexistent in Central and Eastern Europe,
because governments mandated employment for all citizens.23 However,
since the collapse of Communism, Roma unemployment has increased—
with a tendency to be longer term—and many Roma have been permanently
excluded from the labor market.24
Public health is another area of concern for the Roma. The Roma have
faced a variety of health problems due to their social exclusion. The average
Roma life span is nearly ten years less than the majority populations in
Central and Eastern Europe, and the Roma experience higher rates of infant
mortality, malnutrition and disease.25 In some areas, Roma life expectancy
may be as much as twenty years less than the majority population.26 As a
result of poverty, the Roma experience higher rates of disease due in part to
poor diet and stress.27 Additionally, high illiteracy rates contribute to the

21. MARK BELL, RACISM AND EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 90 (2008).
22. James A. Goldston, The Struggle for Roma Rights: Arguments that Have Worked, 32 HUM.
RTS. Q. 311, 314 (2010).
23. See Orsolya Farkas, The Roma and Their Integration to the Labour Market: A Comparison
Between Hungary and Slovakia, 3 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 325, 327 (2003–2004).
24. See Niall O’Higgins & Andrey Ivanov, Education and Employment Opportunities for the
Roma, 48 COMP. ECON. STUD. 6, 10 (2006).
25. Goldston, supra note 22, at 314.
26. MATRIX, ROMA HEALTH REPORT: HEALTH STATUS OF THE ROMA POPULATION. DATA
COLLECTION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 37 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
health/social_determinants/docs/2014_roma_health_report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP2C-TQZD].
27. Id. at 49.
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Roma’s underuse of universally available health services, particularly in
countries where the Roma are migrants.28
The Roma are routinely victims of anti-Roma hate crimes in both
Western and Eastern Europe. The European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) has heard numerous cases involving attacks against Roma by
private individuals; in several situations, Roma houses were burnt by local
populations.29 The Roma have also been the frequent target of police
brutality.30 Across Europe, mob justice and individual hate crimes have left
the Roma beaten, tortured and killed simply for being Roma.31
Beyond these main areas of concern, Roma women face additional
challenges. Roma women have been particularly disadvantaged in the areas
of employment, health and education.32 These disadvantages result in knockon adverse effects for the children of Roma women, who experience
deepened social exclusion as a result of the challenges their mothers face.33
This article focuses specifically on the discrimination Roma children
face in education; particularly the various forms of segregation present in
Central and Eastern Europe. Three million Roma children attend schools
across the European Union, and many face structural discrimination in the
28. Id. at 58.
29. See, e.g., Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 533 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2007); Gergely v. Romania, App.
No. 57885/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2007); Kalanyos and Others v. Romania, App. No. 57884/00, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Guerdner and Others v. France, App. No. 68780/10, 426 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2014);
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43577/98 & 43579/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2005).
31. In July 2015, an Italian court found six people guilty of hate crimes against Roma for an attack
on an informal Roma settlement by a mob intent on punishing the Roma community for the alleged rape
of a non-Roma girl. As part of the attack, the mob set fire to the settlement. Historic Criminal Conviction
for a Violent Assault to a Roma Camp in Italy, EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE (Jul. 17, 2015),
http://www.errc.org/article/historic-criminal-conviction-for-a-violent-assault-to-a-roma-camp-initaly/4385 [https://perma.cc/3WJ4-BABU]. This is a rare case of the perpetrators of anti-Roma violence
being brought to justice. In another case, in 2012, an off-duty police officer shot and killed three Roma
and seriously injured two others in a shooting spree in Slovakia, but was only sentenced to nine years in
prison with no racial motivation considered despite his statements that he was going to “solve the Roma
problem.” Year on from Roma Deaths, ERRC Highlights Low Sentence for Mass Murdered in Slovakia,
EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE (June 17, 2013), http://www.errc.org/article/one-year-on-from-romadeaths-errc-highlights-low-sentence-for-mass-murderer-in-slovakia/4150 [https://perma.cc/W26S-SJD
A].
32. Kristina Koldinská, EU Non-Discrimination Law and Policies in Reaction to Intersectional
Discrimination Against Roma Women in Central and Eastern Europe, in EUROPEAN UNION NONDISCRIMINATION LAW AND INTERSECTIONALITY: INVESTIGATING THE TRIANGLE OF RACIAL, GENDER
AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 241, 242–43 (Dagmar Schiek & Anna Lawson eds., 2011). Koldinská
notes that where mothers bear responsibility for raising children, if they themselves lack advanced
education and live with their children in a socially excluded environment, the social exclusion is more
likely to pass to the next generation. Id. at 243.
33. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 21, at 116 (noting that the Roma infant mortality rate in Romania is
four times the national average).
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form of segregation and institutional discrimination.34 As a result, many fail
to complete primary education and many more fail to complete secondary
school.35 In some regions of Europe, only thirty to forty percent of Roma
children regularly attend school, and up to ninety percent of adults are
illiterate.36 Education is a key predictor of future success and without school
integration, Roma children will remain disadvantaged.
Segregation is shockingly widespread and overt. Three main types of
school-based segregation have arisen: intra-school segregation, where
Roma students are taught inferior curricula in separate classes within the
same school; intra-class segregation, where Roma students are instructed
under different curricular standards within the same class as non-Roma
students; and inter-school segregation, where Roma and non-Roma children
attend different schools based on either residential segregation, poorlydesigned testing that leads to placement in remedial schools, or the creation
of private schools that require tuition or testing for admission to the
disadvantage of Roma children.37 Inter-school segregation is widespread;
particularly in Bulgaria where many Roma children attend geographically
segregated schools, and in Slovakia and the Czech Republic where Roma
children are deemed mentally challenged and sent to remedial schools.38 A
fourth type of segregation, individual segregation, or forced home schooling,
often occurs, albeit with less frequency.39
Jack Greenberg, a renowned civil rights litigator, has noted that unlike
in the United States, where segregation prior to Brown v. Board of Education
was required by law, segregation in Eastern Europe has resulted from a mix
of local official policies (state action) and informal forces, like housing
policies (“de facto” segregation).40 This key difference shapes the remedies
and responses available to address segregation.
Segregation of Roma in European schools is a result of intentional
policies and passive disregard for the obstacles faced by Roma children.
These obstacles include cultural differences, inefficiencies within school

34. FARKAS, supra note 19, at 4.
35. Goldston, supra note 22, at 314.
36. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 131–32.
37. FARKAS, supra note 19, at 10; see also Jack Greenberg, Report on Roma Education Today:
From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 919, 935–36 (2010).
38. Marius Taba & Andrew Ryder, Institutional Responses to Segregation: The Role of
Governments and Non-Governmental Organizations, in TEN YEARS AFTER: A HISTORY OF ROMA
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 7, 9–10 (Iulius Rostas ed., 2012).
39. FARKAS, supra note 19, at 10.
40. Greenberg, supra note 37, at 935.
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systems and discrimination by teachers and fellow students.41 Roma children
who speak Romani at home often face linguistic challenges adapting to
schools where instruction is in another language.42 Roma children may also
lack social skills as a result of extreme poverty.43 In many cases, parents lack
the educational skills to support their children’s schooling, and children
subsequently must leave school at a young age to become economically
productive.44 Many Roma children lack birth certificates for a variety of
reasons, including parental illiteracy and unawareness of government
requirements, parental mistrust of government registration, and hospitals’
unwillingness to assist Roma citizens. Without birth certificates, Roma
children cannot register for school.45 Because preschool is not free in many
countries, Roma children whose parents lack the means to pay for preschool
enter primary school at a disadvantage compared to their white majority
peers.46 Together, these cultural disadvantages—when coupled with
systemic discrimination and an unwillingness on the part of school systems
and governments to integrate and provide the resources necessary to improve
Roma access to education—have resulted in widespread segregation and low
levels of educational achievement for Roma children.
The discrimination by peers and teachers experienced by Roma children
contributes to their segregation and lack of academic success; in fact, some
Roma families prefer segregated schools as a means of avoiding daily
discrimination even where educational quality is significantly inferior.47
Even in integrated school districts, schools often take an assimilationist
approach to educating Roma students,48 believing that Roma students must
abandon their Roma identity and become like the white majority to be
successful. This attitude devalues Roma identity and contributes to feelings
of inferiority among Roma students.
While the brief overview above omits many complexities concerning
the Roma and the discrimination they face, it should be clear that they are
routinely victimized and discriminated against on stereotypical bases. This
discrimination ultimately creates a vicious cycle of poverty, lack of
41. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 146; see also Sina van den Bogaert, Roma Segregation in Education:
Direct or Indirect Discrimination?: An Analysis of the Parallels and Differences Between Council
Directive 2000/43/EC and Recent ECtHR Case Law on Roma Educational Matters, 71 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 721, 721 (2011).
42. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 146.
43. Id. at 148.
44. See id. at 149.
45. UNICEF, supra note 4, at 18.
46. Id. at 17–18.
47. Id. at 18.
48. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 132.
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educational achievement, health problems and criminal activity. As Mathias
Möschel writes: “The example of the Roma is particularly interesting
because it stands in stark contrast to the image of Europe having overcome
its overtly racist past. At the same time, the case of the Roma is so obvious
that even lawyers cannot deny the role of law . . .”49 It is with this
juxtaposition in mind that this article examines the Roma’s segregation and
the failures of EU and national measures to eliminate it. Education is critical
to Roma success, and so long as Roma children lack access to education on
equal terms to their majority peers, the chances of a meaningful decline in
discrimination against Roma are small.
II. CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST THE ROMA
To understand how discrimination against the Roma has continued
unabated despite legal measures enacted to prevent it, it is necessary to look
to critical race theory. The following discussion provides an overview of
critical race theory and explains why it has yet to be widely applied in
Europe. The discussion then undertakes a comparative analysis of the United
States and Europe in order to explain why critical race theory may be applied
to the Roma’s situation in Europe.
A. An Overview of Critical Race Theory
Critical race theory offers a framework for understanding
discrimination against the Roma generally, and more specifically, the
persistent segregation of Roma children. As a movement, critical race theory
is quite new, originating in the United States during the late 1970s.50 Over
the last few years, the theory has been applied to racism in Europe, but only
to a limited extent.
Critical race theory encompasses many different propositions. Its core
principles include the following:
1) Racism is normal rather than aberrational;
2) Racism advances the interests of both white elites and the white
working class, both of which lack incentives to eliminate it; and
3) Races are social constructs rather than genetic reality.51

49. MATHIAS MÖSCHEL, LAW, LAWYERS AND RACE: CRITICAL RACE THEORY FROM THE UNITED
STATES TO EUROPE 145 (2014).
50. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2d
ed. 2012).
51. Id. at 7–8.
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Critical race theory recognizes that racism is engrained in the structure
of society. Where power structures are based on the supremacy of white
majorities, minorities such as African Americans or Roma have little
opportunity to overcome negative perceptions against them. This idea of
structural determinism—an important aspect of critical race theory—
suggests that the system itself is set up in a manner that makes redressing
injustices against minorities more difficult, if not impossible.52 As Charles
R. Lawrence III writes, “[b]ecause racism is so deeply ingrained in our
culture[s], it is likely to be transmitted by tacit understandings: Even if a
child is not told that blacks are inferior, he learns that lesson by observing
the behavior of others.”53 In essence, as a result of systemic structural racism,
minorities internalize their perceived inferiority and view themselves in a
deprecatory fashion.54
Interest convergence is another central concept of critical race theory.
Because white majorities dictate legal and political decision making, they
have little incentive to take action and ameliorate the situation of minorities.
Such actions would reap little to no corresponding benefit for the white
majorities. Derrick A. Bell—a pioneering scholar of critical race theory—
discusses interest convergence in his seminal article on Brown v. Board of
Education. Bell argues that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites.”55 Post-Brown, Bell argues, the Supreme Court’s segregation
decisions reflected a growing divergence between the interests of whites and
blacks, and undermined Brown’s hope and promise.56 As Bell recognizes,
anti-defiance measures intended to force a racial balance, like bussing, failed
to guarantee a better education for black children.57 They also failed to
address other discrimination issues. For instance, school suspensions or
expulsions occur at much higher rates for black students than for white
students.58
One of the key criticisms by critical race theorists against
antidiscrimination laws is that these laws are, to quote Alan David Freeman,

52. Id. at 31.
53. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987).
54. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 29.
55. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
56. Id. at 528.
57. Id. at 530–31.
58. Id. at 531.
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“hopelessly embedded in the perpetrator perspective.”59 Rather than
focusing on the condition of victims, antidiscrimination laws merely focus
on outlawing and neutralizing the effects of specific violations.60 This results
in overemphasis on the perpetrator’s intent, rather than the effect on the
victim. Regardless of the perpetrator’s intent, the victim’s experience is the
most instrumental indicator of discrimination.
In contrast to Europe, where collective rights often supersede individual
rights, the American legal system is founded on principles of individual
rights. In theoretical terms, this means that formal equality predominates
over substantive equality in American jurisprudence, since the focus is on
the individual. The Aristotelian idea of formal equality, or equal treatment,
holds that a person has a right to be treated on equal terms to other persons
similarly situated.61 Formal equality focuses on the individual, who is central
in both enforcement procedures and remedies. Individuals are also primarily
responsible for bringing claims of discrimination before courts.62 In contrast,
substantive equality, or equality-in-fact, is less individually-focused, and
instead considers the effects of discrimination on members of a particular
group. Substantive equality aims to compensate classes of individuals for the
disadvantages and inequalities they have experienced.63 This approach
eschews the individualistic focus of formal equality, and instead emphasizes
the “collective experiences of inequality.”64 Whereas formal equality
requires equal treatment for all—as illustrated by prohibitions of direct
discrimination65—substantive equality may require unequal treatment in
order to offset social disadvantages and achieve equality.66 Affirmative
action—or positive action, as known in Europe—is an application of the
principles underlying substantive equality.
Two additional subcategories of substantive equality have been
recognized—equality of opportunity and equality of results.67 Equality of
opportunity “is not concerned with the end result, but only aims to make the
starting point equal for all;” as such, equality of opportunity may call for

59. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053–54 (1978).
60. Id.
61. ERICA HOWARD, THE EU RACE DIRECTIVE: DEVELOPING THE PROTECTION AGAINST RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE EU 109 (2010).
62. Id. at 114.
63. Id. at 115.
64. BELL, supra note 21, at 32.
65. Id. at 28.
66. HOWARD, supra note 61, at 115.
67. Id. at 117.
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unequal treatment and unequal finishing points.68 In other words, equality of
opportunity aims to provide all parties with the same opportunities, even if
that requires initially treating certain parties more favorably than others.
Equality of results takes into account past discrimination and focuses on
redistributing goods and resources more fairly.69 It differs from equality of
opportunity in that it is focused on ensuring equality at the finishing point,
rather than at an initial starting point. These distinctions can be difficult to
define, and in applying principles of substantive equality, there are risks of
ascribing immutable characteristics of group membership to individual
members in a group while overlooking internal diversity.70 Nevertheless,
substantive equality offers a more nuanced approach to rectifying
discrimination than does formal equality, particularly where de jure
segregation resulting in direct discrimination (such as pre-Brown segregation
in the United States) does not exist.
In addressing segregation, the United States Supreme Court initially
contemplated the application of affirmative action and adopted a more
substantive, equality-based approach. In subsequent years, however, the
Court has backtracked and adopted a more traditional, individual rightsbased approach grounded in formal equality. This, as Alan David Freeman
writes, is the era of rationalization, where the pretense that is associated with
the color-blind theory of racial discrimination is “that but for an occasional
aberrational practice, future society is already here and functioning.”71 In this
view, “the actual conditions of racial powerlessness, poverty, and
unemployment can be regarded as no more than conditions—not as racial
discrimination.”72 Rationalization means treating these conditions “as
historical accidents or products of a malevolent fate, or, even worse, . . .
blaming the victims as inadequate to function in the good society.”73
Freeman’s view on color-blindness is instrumental in understanding critical
race theory and the failure of European antidiscrimination measures to
reduce segregation and improve the situation of Roma children in education.
Critical race theory stands in sharp contrast to the belief in colorblindness shared by many liberals74 and embraced by the United States
Supreme Court, which has used color blindness to “slowly but surely
dismantle the use of race and race-conscious remedies by the legislator and
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 120.
See BELL, supra note 21, at 36–40.
Freeman, supra note 59, at 1103.
Id.
Id.
See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 50, at 26.
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public authorities.”75 Critical race theory, on the other hand, holds that
merely acting as if race does not matter, or indeed acting as if taking into
account race to rectify past injustices is itself a wrong, will not eliminate
racism or ameliorate the situation of minorities. Critical race theorists instead
believe that “[o]nly aggressive color-conscious efforts to change the way
things are will do much to ameliorate misery.”76 Color-blindness also
permeates European discourse on discrimination, and critical race theory
offers a necessary counterpoint to this view.
Critical race theory is primarily an American theory, and the lack of
scholarship addressing the theory in Europe is perplexing; particularly given
the growing racial tensions in Europe towards both migrants and Roma, and
the strong focus among both scholars and policy makers on antidiscrimination principles. Mathias Möschel—one of the few European
scholars to grapple directly with the application of critical race theory to
European law—has argued that since Europe does not have the same focus
on liberal individual rights as the United States, “[critical race theory’s]
heavy critique of the liberal individual rights model was ‘doomed’ from the
beginning by Europe’s different tradition, leaving it without any bite.”77
Additionally, Möschel argues that because continental European law
operates according to a “systematic, scientific, top to bottom view,” critical
race theory, which offers a more emotive, bottom-up perspective of the law,
has faced particular challenges in entering into European legal analysis.78 As
Möschel notes, “one of the fundamental points European legal scholarship
can and must learn from [critical race theory] is that law is not a neutral
science.”79
This aspect of the civil law jurisdictions that form the core of
continental Europe’s legal systems—that law is viewed as a neutral
science—is worth emphasizing. In most European countries, legal systems
are constructed under the presumption that law is itself neutral. Law is
elevated to the status of a scientific principle, and judges in many European
countries are even prohibited from referring to scholarly works in their
decisions.80 Thus, academic scholarship and legal practice are separated by
different perceptions of the law and European legal scholars respond by
focusing on abstract theoretical frameworks rather than practical
75. MÖSCHEL, supra note 49, at 47.
76. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 50, at 27.
77. Mathias Möschel, Color Blindness or Total Blindness? The Absence of Critical Race Theory in
Europe, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 57, 80 (2007).
78. Id. at 94–95.
79. Id. at 106.
80. MÖSCHEL, supra note 49, at 108–09.
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applications of the law. In this environment, theories such as critical race
theory find less purchase because they are critical of systemic structures and
judicial decisions.
There is a third element that has prevented critical race theory from
gaining a foothold in Europe—the difference between European and
American perceptions of race. European perspectives on race and racism are
indelibly linked to the Holocaust and the racially-focused laws and actions
propagated by the Nazi regime to eliminate the Jewish population.81 These
historical ties have resulted in a profound reluctance among Europeans to
describe anything in terms of race. Instead, Europeans have tempered
discussions of race and ethnicity by using terms such as prejudice and
xenophobia.82 While American anti-discrimination legislation began by
focusing on racial discrimination before moving to other areas such as
gender and disability, anti-discrimination legislation in Europe began by
addressing gender discrimination, and only later targeted racial
discrimination.83
B. Critical Race Theory and the Segregation of Roma Children
The applicability of critical race theory to the Roma’s situation in
Europe is best understood by comparison to the experiences of African
Americans in the United States. While there are substantive differences
between the two minority groups, critical race theory is not designed to speak
solely to the situation of African Americans. Rather, the theory is applicable
to both communities given their similar experiences of disenfranchisement
amidst societies dominated by white majorities. A comparison with African
Americans serves to highlight the extent of the discrimination faced by the
Roma and the challenges hindering efforts to desegregate schools. In
particular, identification as Roma carries with it a stigma similar to that borne
by African Americans, and Roma are often described as lacking a positive
identity. Schools that desegregate have experienced white flight as a result.
The approach by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education offers a starting point for our comparison of segregation in the
United States and segregation of Roma children in Europe. Brown is one of
the most important cases in American legal history, yet its implementation
and long-term effects have been clouded by persistent structural racism.
Desegregation post-Brown required heavy involvement by the federal
government, both in enforcing the decision and in implementing legislation
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 92.
See id. at 93.
See id. at 92.
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to help give it effect. Even then, as Alan David Freeman explains, Brown’s
effect on black school children was more limited than anticipated:
By way of hindsight, the case stood for both more and less than a guarantee
of equal educational quality. It came to stand for more insofar as its
holding was quickly extended to other forms of state imposed segregation.
But it stood for a great deal less insofar as black children today have
neither an affirmative right to receive an integrated education nor a right
to equality of resources for their schools, which, ironically, was a litigable
claim under the regime of de jure segregation. 84

This failure to achieve the promised equality in the aftermath of Brown
provides a lesson on the limitations of legal systems in effecting substantive
societal change. While laws can prohibit formal discrimination, they cannot
by themselves change minds and remove centuries of ingrained racism.85
Brown’s significance as a case study on the reasons underlying the
continued segregation of Roma children runs beyond the decision itself.
Critical race theorists and other scholars have criticized the decision and the
failed efforts post-Brown to achieve equality in education despite a clear
mandate to desegregate American schools. As Jack Greenberg has written
on the issue of segregation of Roma children, “[s]imilarities between Roma
and African American school segregation suggest consulting U.S.
experience, but not uncritically adopting its remedies,” since the process of
desegregation in the United States “is now crippled by a near impenetrable
barrier between city and suburb and a recently imposed Supreme Court
prohibition of affirmative action, even when voluntarily adopted by
communities.”86
The legacy of Brown, particularly re-segregation in the United States,87
highlights the difficulties of successfully maintaining school integration and
illustrates the limitations of desegregation in post-Brown society. Until the
1969 Supreme Court case Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education
(which demanded that desegregation take place immediately, after years of
delays and excuses),88 districts were considered desegregated so long as there
was partial, rather than complete, desegregation. Thus, as a result of
residential segregation, urban schools typically remained segregated.89
Alexander addressed this obstacle by requiring immediate and complete
84. Freeman, supra note 59, at 1068.
85. See HOWARD, supra note 61, at 70.
86. Greenberg, supra note 37, at 977.
87. Much scholarly attention has been given to the problem of re-segregation in the United States.
See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
88. Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
89. Greenberg, supra note 37, at 984.
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desegregation. However, after the Supreme Court’s holding in Milliken v.
Bradley,90 courts were once again restricted in their capacity to require
desegregation across school districts and desegregation efforts were
stalled.91 Ultimately, the period between Alexander and Milliken allowed
only five years of thorough desegregation before progress toward integration
slowed and eventually began to reverse course. Today, racial integration
within the United States has unraveled and re-segregation has occurred
through the judicial and legislative elimination of legal and policy tools
necessary to prevent de facto segregation.
Re-segregation within the United States has been propelled by an
emphasis on market access that has redefined the Constitution’s role in
protecting individual rights. The approach increasingly taken by the United
States Supreme Court in relation to the hierarchy of norms places market
access above individual rights, and can be compared with similar approaches
taken by legislation and case law in the European Union, which—in keeping
with its origins as an economic union—has focused primarily on providing
market access. Within this economic framework, as Derrick A. Bell argues,
white majorities in the United States have willingly accepted a widening gap
with regard to economic opportunities, but only so long as they retain priority
in accessing these limited opportunities over blacks and other racial
minorities.92 The same can be said for white Europeans.
White flight has plagued Central European schools where ethnic
diversity is less tolerated, much like in the United States following Brown II
and its requirement that schools desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”93
and particularly after Alexander. In many cases, where school districts in
Central Europe have attempted to integrate and eliminate segregation
between Roma and non-Roma students, non-Roma parents have either
removed their children from integrated schools and placed them into private
academies or moved them to different school districts altogether.94 The
threshold percentage of Roma students triggering this white flight appears to
be around twenty to forty percent.95 Many statements about the Roma by
90. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
91. Greenberg, supra note 37, at 984.
92. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Postracial Epoch,
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 2, 7–8 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed.
2013).
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
94. See Claire Schiff, Introduction: Understanding the Salience of Ethnicity in the Educational
Experiences of Minority Adolescents Across Europe in MIGRANT, ROMA AND POST-COLONIAL YOUTH
IN EDUCATION ACROSS EUROPE: BEING ‘VISIBLY DIFFERENT’ 1, 9 (Julia Szalai & Claire Schiff eds.,
2014).
95. Vera Messing, Apart or Together: Motivations Behind Ethnic Segregation in Education Across
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parents and educators among the white majority echo viewpoints held by
those who opposed desegregation in the United States during the 1950s and
60s. These statements blame the inadequate culture and morals of the Roma
families for the failure of Roma children to succeed educationally;96 some
even ascribe Roma students’ academic struggles to “blood.”97 Much of the
discourse on Roma children from educators emphasizes their ‘otherness’ as
a reason for the Roma’s failure to thrive in education. These statements
ignore the effects of discrimination and economic deprivation on childrens’
ability to learn and succeed.98
Throughout Europe, identification as Roma carries with it a stigma
similar to that experienced by African Americans in the United States.99 The
social consequences of this stigmatization are twofold: stigmatized Roma
children are psychologically harmed by the assault on their self-respect and
dignity, and the children are branded as outcasts and as inferior.100 Racial
stigma is self-perpetuating.101 As a result of racial stigma, Roma children
experience fewer opportunities to flourish. With fewer educational and
experiential opportunities, Roma children rarely achieve success and, as
Charles Lawrence writes, “the prophecy of their inferiority is fulfilled.”102
Roma youth are often limited in their vocational dreams to those areas where
their presence is tolerated, such as construction, and they receive little
encouragement or support from their predominantly white educators.103 As a
result of the stigmatization process, multi-generational poverty is frequently
misconstrued as a cultural trait for which the Roma themselves are morally
responsible.104
Within this framework, the continued segregation of Roma students is
arguably the most prominent factor limiting the Roma’s opportunities and
perpetuating their cycle of poverty. Among the various forms of segregation

Europe, in MIGRANT, ROMA AND POST-COLONIAL YOUTH IN EDUCATION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note
94, at 17, 27; see also Taba & Ryder, supra note 38, at 9.
96. Claire Schiff, Teachers’ Approaches to Ethnic Minority Students through a Comparative Lens,
in MIGRANT, ROMA AND POST-COLONIAL YOUTH IN EDUCATION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 94, at 51,
57.
97. Id. at 64; see also Taba & Ryder, supra note 38, at 14.
98. Schiff, supra note 94, at 3.
99. See id.
100. Lawrence, supra note 53, at 351.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Julia Szalai, The Emerging ‘Ethnic Ceiling’: Implications of Grading on Adolescents’
Education Advancement in Comparative Perspective, in MIGRANT, ROMA AND POST-COLONIAL YOUTH
IN EDUCATION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 94, at 67, 81–82.
104. Id. at 80.
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in Central and Eastern Europe are “zero-grade” systems in Slovakian
schools. These programs are designed to prepare children lacking in social
and academic skills for participation in normal primary school classes.
However, these programs often fail to provide the necessary preparation and
frequently track Roma children into lower-level academic curricula.105
Another disguised form of segregation found particularly in Hungary and
Romania uses existing legal protections designed to promote national
minority education to keep Roma children together in classrooms;
purportedly helping them overcome language barriers and attend special
classes relating to their Romani ethnicity.106 In Bulgaria, schools in districts
with dwindling student populations enroll Roma students from settlements
up to thirty miles away to meet student enrollment requirements, without
providing transportation for these students. As such, Roma children are
effectively excluded from the educational system.107 In each of these
examples, measures that purport to aid Roma children ultimately act as
disguised forms of segregation that entrench the Roma’s unfortunate status
quo.
Most discussion of educational reform with regards to the Roma has
focused on the integration of Roma children into majority white school
systems. By itself, however, the absolute integration or assimilation of Roma
children into white-dominated schools will not improve Roma education.
Rather, Roma identities and differences must be valued and the culture’s
‘otherness’ must be translated into a positive understanding of diversity. In
rare circumstances where negative perceptions of the Roma have not been
entrenched in the historical consciousness, the Roma have thrived.108
One frequently repeated statement regarding the Roma is that they lack
characteristics capable of providing them with a positive sense of identity.
In response to critics who claim the Roma lack a positive identity, we need
only consider the situation of African Americans in the United States before

105. Taba & Ryder, supra note 38, at 12; see also Messing, supra note 95, at 23.
106. Taba & Ryder, supra note 38, at 12–13.
107. Id. at 13.
108. The example of Túrkeve springs to mind. Túrkeve is a small town of about 9,000 inhabitants
in eastern Hungary, where for various cultural and historical reasons, the Roma are relatively successful
and unusually integrated into the community. (This is not to say that there is no anti-Roma sentiment:
local non-Roma, like almost everyone you meet in Hungary, often resort to stereotypes in characterizing
Roma.) There is no Roma shantytown at the outskirts of the town, and while the Roma did mostly inhabit
the periphery of the town, due to existing prejudices, the level of anti-Roma sentiment never resulted in
full Roma exclusion. While systemic prejudices still remain, entrenched in the very vocabulary of modern
social and legal discourse, the Roma minority in the town are at least as successful as the white majority.
This demonstrates the brutally insidious effects that harsh negative perceptions of Roma have over time,
since there is no reason why this town should be such an anomaly in Central Europe.
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the Civil Rights Movement led to widespread embrace of African American
identity. At present, Roma identity is viewed positively only in the limited
realm of music and entertainment. These views are strikingly similar to white
majority perceptions of African Americans in the United States prior to the
Civil Rights Movement.
Many recent efforts to address segregation in European schools have
focused on the integration of immigrant minority groups into national school
systems. The Roma have unique socioeconomic attributes that differentiate
them from other racial and ethnic minorities in Europe. They are not
immigrants, and like African Americans in the United States, have
experienced centuries of oppression by a white majority population. It is, in
fact, indicative of the discrimination Roma face throughout Europe that most
contemporary discourse on race in Europe has arisen not in response to the
plight of the Roma—Europe’s largest racial and ethnic minority—but in
response to growing immigrant populations; a much more recent
phenomenon. While the plight of immigrants is a pressing concern, it is
shameful that the systematic oppression of millions of Roma has continued
unabated for so long and only gained traction by way of association with a
smaller-scale, but higher profile problem. Despite years of policies,
discourse and laws focusing on the Roma, racism and discriminatory
attitudes entrenched among the majority population have resulted in little
positive change.
III. EU AND NATIONAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE
EU and national anti-discrimination laws have thus far proven
inadequate to eliminate segregation in European schools. Over the last
fifteen years, the European Union has issued numerous policy statements,
studies and pronouncements on the Roma in an effort to improve their
situation.109 Apart from the European Union, the Decade of Roma
Inclusion—a ten-year, multinational project between twelve EU and non-EU
European nations with large Roma populations—was launched in 2005 to
enhance the lives of the Roma.110 The Decade of Roma Inclusion formally
ended in September 2015. Ultimately, most measures implemented by the
109. See, e.g., The Social and Economic Integration of the Roma in Europe, COM (2010) 133 final
(Apr. 7, 2010); National Roma Integration Strategies: A First Step in the Implementation of the EU
Framework, COM (2012) 226 final (May 21, 2012); Council Recommendation on Effective Roma
Integration Measures in the Member States, 2013 O.J. (C 378) 56, 1.
110. EBEN FRIEDMAN, UNDP, DECADE OF ROMA INCLUSION PROGRESS REPORT 6 (2015),
http://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/dam/rbec/docs/DORI%20REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/65QV-2
SJE].
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European Union and the Decade of Roma Inclusion have proven ineffective
in addressing discrimination against the Roma. Where there has been
substantive development, albeit not necessarily as a result of policies towards
the Roma, is in the realm of anti-discrimination legislation and
jurisprudence. This section focuses on these legal instruments and opinions,
and argues that EU anti-discrimination law—as currently enforced—is
inadequate to address discrimination against the Roma. The educational
segregation of Roma children has continued throughout Europe, even though
it is illegal under the EU Race Directive, ECtHR case law—particularly the
decisions in D.H. and Others, Sampanis, and Orsus and Others—and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“ICERD”). Existing ECtHR jurisprudence lacks associated
enforcement capabilities, and when coupled with a lack of jurisprudence in
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), this deficiency poses
a major obstacle to eliminating Roma segregation.
For many European countries, racial homogeneity has given way to a
degree of heterogeneity with the arrival of immigrants from Asia, the Middle
East and Africa. In an effort to eschew a milieu of discrimination, European
discourse has revolved around indirect discussions of race, focusing instead
on ‘ethnicity’ and ‘national minorities,’ and on ‘prejudice’ or ‘xenophobia’
rather than ‘racism’—even where race is clearly at issue. As previously
discussed, modern Europe’s unwillingness to address racism directly is a
legacy of atrocities committed during the Second World War. The
unwillingness stems from a fear that using the rhetoric of racial differences
could lead down a slippery slope to racial and ethnic profiling. In avoiding
the term ‘race’ in favor of terms such as ‘ethnic minority,’ however, Europe
is making it easier for those who deny universal equality on the basis of skin
color to brush racial differences under vague, blanket terms that apply
equally to German-speaking white minorities in Hungary as they do to
Bangladeshi immigrants in the UK and to Roma in Slovakia. For instance, if
a white, German-speaking Hungarian individual is an ethnic minority in the
same manner as a Roma individual, discrimination against the Roma
individual will likely be subsumed into a general discussion of ethnicity that
fails to identify the vastly different circumstances surrounding each
individual. The challenges facing white ethnic minorities will inevitably be
different than those facing non-white minorities, whether immigrants or
historical minorities.
This section examines some of the key legal instruments and decisions
in the European Union relating to anti-discrimination through the lens of
critical race theory; particularly the Race Equality Directive, and the
jurisprudence and roles of the CJEU and the ECtHR. This analysis illustrates
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that weaknesses in European anti-discrimination law alone are insufficient
to explain the continued educational segregation of Roma children. Instead,
I argue that continued failure to desegregate schools is a result of racism and
systemic discrimination against the Roma that is so profound as to make
effective legal action nearly impossible; especially given that legislative
measures are ineffective without proper enforcement. Within these
instruments, however, lie the seeds of justice, waiting to be sown.
A. The Race Equality Directive
The 2000 Race Equality Directive was a key development in European
anti-discrimination law, particularly given the broader context of EU antidiscrimination law and jurisprudence. As an economic union comprised of
independent nations, the European Union focused historically on facilitating
market access among its Member States rather than on furthering individual
rights. In this sense, anti-discrimination law in the European Union differs
from national anti-discrimination laws derived from constitutional principles
or from international human rights laws in that it focuses primarily on
marketplace activities.111
The original treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(“EEC”), the predecessor to the European Union, included a provision
requiring equal pay between genders.112 The motivations underlying the
provision were economic and unrelated to gender equality, however.
France—having already implemented similar equal pay provisions—was
concerned about unfair economic competition given that female labor could
be obtained at lower cost elsewhere in the EEC.113 In 1976, the CJEU, in the
seminal case Defrenne II, ruled that Article 119 on equal pay had a social as
well as an economic aim and opened the door to the European Union’s
involvement with fundamental human rights.114 A series of cases concerning
gender-based discrimination followed.115 However, it was not until the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 that the European Union gained the power to
legislate against discrimination with Article 19 of the Treaty on the

111. See Dagmar Schiek, Organizing EU Equality Law Around the Nodes of ‘Race’, Gender and
Disability, in EUROPEAN UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND INTERSECTIONALITY: INVESTIGATING
THE TRIANGLE OF RACIAL, GENDER AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, supra note 32, at 11, 20.
112. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 119, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11.
113. SUSANNE BURRI & SACHA PRECHAL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU GENDER EQUALITY LAW:
UPDATE 2013, 2 (2014).
114. Id. at 2 (citing Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
115. Id. at 21–24.
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Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).116 The Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became legally binding
in 2009, took this a step further, formally enshrining both a prohibition of
race-based discrimination117 and a right to education.118
Anti-discrimination law pertaining specifically to race is a relatively
recent development within the European Union and its Member States.
While most Western European countries had enacted provisions on
constitutional equality and established general anti-discrimination laws by
the early 1990s, only six countries had specific anti-racism legislation at that
time.119 In 2000, the European Union passed Directive 2000/43 (the “Race
Equality Directive”), which addresses race discrimination in a broad range
of areas.120 The Directive’s preamble explicitly states that an important goal
is “[t]o ensure the development of democratic and tolerant societies which
allow the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic
origin.”121 To achieve this goal, “specific action in the field of discrimination
based on racial or ethnic origin should go beyond access to employed and
self-employed activities and cover areas such as education, social protection
including social security and health-care, social advantages and access to and
supply of goods and services.”122 The goal above is reiterated in greater detail
in Article 3 of the Directive, which defines the Directive’s scope and
specifies that its non-discrimination requirements apply to “all persons, as
regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies.”123
Under this broad mandate, the Race Equality Directive covers more than
equivalent EU legislation countering discrimination based on gender, sexual
orientation, religion and belief, disability, or age.124
The Race Equality Directive explicitly embraces the European Union’s
role as an upholder of fundamental rights and recognizes that the European

116. See Schiek, supra note 111, at 12.
117. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, Art. 21(1). The
Charter prohibits discrimination on any grounds including “sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.”
118. Id. at art. 14.
119. Jan Niessen & Isabelle Chopin, The Starting Line and the Racial Equality Directive, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT RACISM IN A DIVERSE EUROPE 95, 98 (Jan Niessen
& Isabelle Chopin eds., 2004).
120. Council Directive 2000/43, pmbl. para. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 43, 22 (EC) [hereinafter Race
Equality Directive].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at art. 3.
124. Schiek, supra note 111, at 15.
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Union must go beyond its traditional economic mandate. Nevertheless, the
Race Equality Directive, like all other EU directives, does not have
horizontal direct effect—individuals cannot bring claims against other
individuals on the basis of the Directive alone. Instead, the Directive requires
Member States to implement its provisions within their national laws. This
arguably dilutes the Directive’s effectiveness. Within the European Union,
only two non-discrimination rights are directly effective—gender and
nationality of a Member State. All other non-discrimination rights must first
be transposed into national law to be effective.125
Given European discomfort with the use of terminology relating to race,
the Race Equality Directive was carefully worded to avoid the possibility of
misconstruction. The Directive’s preamble expressly disclaims any
adherence to theories of racial difference, stating that “[t]he European Union
rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human
races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive does not imply an
acceptance of such theories.”126
The Directive represents a shift in the European conceptualization of
racial discrimination in two ways. First, it accepts, albeit reluctantly, the
premise that racism exists in Europe, a necessary step in addressing racial
discrimination in a legal setting, for without acknowledgment of the
problem, no lasting solution can be found.127 Second, prior to the enactment
of the Race Equality Directive, most efforts to address racial discrimination
were channeled through criminal law.128 In this latter respect, the Race
Equality Directive represents a crucial mechanism for addressing indirect
discrimination—the most challenging form of discrimination to prove and
the variety most frequently exhibited in cases of school segregation. Article
2(2)(b) of the Race Equality Directive defines indirect discrimination as
situations “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would
put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared
with other persons.”129 This definition suggests that a finding of indirect
discrimination may be made even in the absence of thorough statistical data,
indicating a divergence from earlier jurisprudence relating to gender-based
discrimination where statistical evidence was required for findings of
125. Id.
126. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at pmbl. para. 6.
127. See, e.g., MÖSCHEL, supra note 49, at 128. As Möschel notes, “[t]he reluctance to frame objects
or situations in terms of race also extends to a reluctance to frame persons as racists or their behaviour in
terms of racism. Consequently, a narrow legal definition of racism and a racist under law emerges. In
fact, not talking about race has all but eliminated racism in the legal realm.”
128. Id. at 138.
129. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at art. 2(2)(b).
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indirect discrimination.130 The Directive’s shift is also illustrated in its
provisions relating to the burden of proof in discrimination claims. Article 8
shifts the burden of proof and requires respondents to prove there has been
no breach of the principle of equal treatment.131 The plaintiff’s responsibility
is to “establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which
it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination.”132
This burden is arguably less onerous than proving the existence of
discrimination. This shift in the burden of proof places victims in a much
stronger procedural position.133
Affirmative action—or positive action, as known in the European
Union—is explicitly permitted but not required under Article 5 of the Race
Equality Directive. Article 5 provides that “the principle of equal treatment
shall not prevent any Member States from maintaining or adopting specific
measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or
ethnic origin.”134 Positive action is grounded in the principle of substantive
equality, as it allows for unequal treatment to rectify disadvantages created
by the underlying discrimination in order to achieve equality in fact.135 As
such, positive action emphasizes the victim’s perspective rather than the
perpetrator’s perspective.
Positive action has been widely recognized as a prerequisite for
achieving equality. In 2000, the Council of Europe—a broader European
institution of which the European Court of Human Rights is a part—issued
a recommendation for furthering Roma education that suggested establishing
support structures to help Roma children succeed in schools, particularly
through positive action.136 In the European Union, the CJEU has been
relatively restrictive in its interpretation of positive action with regards to
gender discrimination, often favoring procedural over substantive

130. Sejal Parmar, The European Court of Justice and Anti-Discrimination Law: Some Reflections
on the Experience of Gender Equality Jurisprudence for the Future Interpretation of the Racial Equality
Directive, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT RACISM IN A DIVERSE EUROPE
131, 145 (Jan Niessen & Isabelle Chopin eds., 2004); see also HOWARD, supra note 61, at 144.
131. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at art. 8(1).
132. Id.
133. Case C-394/11,Valeri Hariev Belov v. CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others, Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2012:585, at para. 91 (Belg.) [hereinafter Belov, AG Opinion].
134. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at art. 5; see also Belov, AG Opinion, supra note 133
at pmbl. para. 17.
135. HOWARD, supra note 61, at 115.
136. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(2000)4 of the Committee
of Ministers to Member States on the Education of Roma/Gypsy Children in Europe, 3 Feb. 2000, at App.
I(6).
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equality.137 Although the CJEU has yet to deal with cases of positive action
involving race discrimination, it will likely follow a jurisprudential path
similar to that established in relation to gender discrimination; particularly
since the wording of the positive action provision in the Race Equality
Directive is identical to the positive action provision in the Gender Equality
Directive.138 While a number of EU Member States have expressed their
commitment to positive action in relation to the Roma—including as part of
the Decade of Roma Inclusion—these commitments have rarely resulted in
substantive change.139
Thus far, the Race Equality Directive has failed to meet expectations.
Since its enactment in 2000, only three cases before the CJEU have
concerned the interpretation of substantive provisions of the Race Equality
Directive. One of these cases involved a Belgian company that openly
refused to hire immigrant employees.140 The other two cases involved
Roma.141 The first case, Belov, was dismissed because the referring national
body was not considered a court and thus lacked the authority to refer the
dispute to the CJEU.142 The second case, CHEZ RB, provided meaningful
clarification of the Directive. These cases are discussed in greater detail
below.
The drafting of the Race Equality Directive also raises some concerns.
In particular, the Directive’s failure to define “racial segregation” creates
difficulties when addressing cases of educational segregation.143 The
Directive also somewhat problematically allows for the justification of
indirect discrimination where there is a legitimate aim and the means of
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. In contrast, direct
discrimination cannot be justified unless it results from a “genuine and
137. For commentary on the interpretation of “positive action” by the CJEU in cases of gender
discrimination, see O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 90; see also HOWARD, supra note 61, at 152.
138. See Council Directive 2004/113, art. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 373) 37 (EC) [hereinafter Gender Equality
Directive] (implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and
supply of goods and services); Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at art. 5.
139. Taba & Ryder, supra note 38, at 23.
140. Case C 54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn
NV 2008 E.C.R. I-05187 (Belg.) [hereinafter Feryn, Judgment].
141. Case C-394/11, Valeri Hariev Belov v. CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and Others, 2013
ECLI:EU:C:2013:48 [hereinafter Belov Judgment]; Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v.
Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:480 [hereinafter CHEZ RB, Judgment].
142. Belov Judgment,¶¶ 54–55.
143. See Iulius Rostas, Judicial Policy Making: The Role of the Courts in Promoting School
Desegregation, in TEN YEARS AFTER: A HISTORY OF ROMA SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE 91, 97 (Iulius Rostas ed. 2012). Rostas notes that there is no proper definition of racial
segregation in the European Convention on Human Rights, nor is there a proper definition provided by
international organizations.
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determining” occupational requirement, or is the result of positive action.144
This controversial allowance permits national courts to accept improper
justifications for indirect discrimination in such a manner that undermines
the effectiveness of the Directive’s provision on indirect discrimination.
B. Data Privacy
Data collection and privacy are closely related to the Race Equality
Directive and to questions surrounding its effectiveness. Because of
historical concerns regarding racial and ethnic profiling, European privacy
law limits the collection of data on racial and ethnic minorities. Even the idea
of data collection frightens many Europeans.145 Consequently, one of the
biggest challenges facing advocates for Roma equality is the accessibility of
adequate statistical proof of direct or indirect discrimination.146 Data
collection is crucial in uncovering evidence of indirect discrimination; data
is critical in demonstrating the discriminatory effects of facially neutral
policies. Even the population size of the Roma in Europe varies wildly
between official and unofficial estimates as a result of data collection issues.
As Lilla Farkas states in her report on the educational segregation of Roma
children, “[l]ack of data does not only seriously hinder the creation of
policies or positive action measures, but may pose serious challenges to
effective judicial protection from structural discrimination in education.”147
Furthermore, although most EU Member States have enacted positive action
policies to aid Roma communities, the lack of accurate data means that the
impact of these policies is often unknown.148 EU Member States have also
cited the lack of accurate data in response to claims of discrimination and
segregation against the Roma.149 On the flipside, years of persecution by
majority populations have made the Roma, like members of other persecuted
ethnic and racial minority groups, wary of what governments may do with

144. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120, at arts. 2, 4, 5; see also HOWARD, supra note 61, at
146. Howard posits that perhaps the justification of indirect discrimination is because the EU legislators
viewed direct discrimination as more offensive and repugnant.
145. TIMO MAKKONEN, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, MEASURING DISCRIMINATION: DATA
COLLECTION AND EU EQUALITY LAW 13 (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=1687&la
ngId=en [https://perma.cc/FCF3-ZGYC].
146. See MAKKONEN, supra note 145, at 40 (discussing the usefulness of statistical data in the
context of legal proceedings on discrimination).
147. FARKAS, supra note 19, at 5.
148. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 37, at 927 (noting that “[t]he lack of demographic
information often prevents targeted efforts to meet the needs of distinct populations. It is nearly
impossible to assess whether or not programs designed to aid Roma citizens are actually working”).
149. See FARKAS, supra note 19, at 37–38.
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data on their Roma identity.150 As a result of the Roma’s unwillingness to
provide personal data, even when governments are willing and able to collect
aggregate data about the Roma, the information they collect is often
inaccurate.
The 1995 Data Privacy Directive provides the basis for the European
Union’s data collection policies. The Directive aims to protect individuals
with regards to the processing of their personal data and with respect to
where the data is sent outside of the European Union.151 Contrary to common
belief, this does not forbid all data processing. Data processing is permitted
so long as the subject of the data provides their consent, or, absent consent,
if data processing is a necessary component of legal proceedings, or as part
of activities by public authorities to ensure equal treatment.152 Most
significantly, EU data privacy regulations do not apply to the aggregate
collection of data relating to societal or cultural groups, or to the
categorization of data by ethnicity.153 The Data Privacy Directive is focused
on protecting individuals’ personal data rather than the protection of group
data.154 Nevertheless, the supposed restrictions on data processing have been
used by governments as an excuse to justify their inability or unwillingness
to furnish data on school demographics.155 At the same time, these
governments have willingly provided data concerning demographics in
relation to crime. Such governmental behavior suggests that data processing
has become a selective exercise, and that the Data Privacy Directive is often
wielded as a shield against providing data that would support the existence
of widespread school segregation.
The importance of accurate statistical data in segregation cases cannot
be overstated. While the Race Equality Directive appears to have moved
away from the stringent statistical evidentiary requirements in gender
discrimination cases, statistics remain crucial in establishing structural
discrimination in education.156 In this sense, the relevance of statistics goes
beyond proving disparate impact in cases of indirect discrimination; indeed,
data demonstrating ethnic or racial disproportionality between schools or

150. UNICEF, supra note 4, at 39.
151. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31 (EC).
152. FARKAS, supra note 19, at 36 (citing MAKKONEN, supra note 145, at 85).
153. UNICEF, supra note 4, at 39.
154. See MAKKONEN, supra note 145, at 72.
155. Lilla Farkas has noted that “[l]itigation experience in Hungary shows that respondents merrily
invoke data protection provisions in an attempt to defend their refusal to furnish even school or grade
level aggregate data on Roma.” FARKAS, supra note 19, at 37.
156. See id. at 41; see also MAKKONEN, supra note 145, at 15 (noting that data collection is
particularly relevant to findings of indirect discrimination).
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classrooms is required to establish a prima facie case of segregation.157
Adding to the difficulty for potential plaintiffs in indirect discrimination
cases is that in order to determine if there is a prima facie case of
discrimination, they would realistically need access to the data before
bringing the claim.158
The challenges with data collection and data privacy in relation to the
segregation of Roma children are twofold. So long as governments may
selectively choose which data to provide while hiding behind inaccurate
interpretations of the Data Privacy Directive, situations of indirect
discrimination will remain difficult to prove. Additionally, as long as the
Roma are wary of government and unwilling to provide accurate data in
censuses and elsewhere, the data available will remain an inadequate
reflection of discrimination. Addressing these challenges requires
transparent policies governing data collection, greater institutional capacity
with regards to data collection, and active engagement with Roma
communities to alleviate their privacy concerns.159
C. The European Court of Justice and the Race Equality Directive
As previously mentioned, there are currently only three judgments of
the CJEU on the Race Equality Directive—Feryn, Belov and CHEZ RB.
Belov and CHEZ RB addressed situations involving discrimination against
the Roma. Feryn, the first CJEU case to interpret the Race Equality
Directive, involved a Belgian company whose director issued public
statements refusing to hire Moroccans after posting a job vacancy notice.160
The Feryn Court held that public statements by an employer refusing to hire
employees of a certain ethnic or racial background does constitute direct
discrimination, since such statements are likely to dissuade certain
candidates from applying for the job.161 This was a fairly straightforward
case and did not require the Court to provide nuanced interpretations of the
Directive.

157.
158.

FARKAS, supra note 19, at 38.
MAKKONEN, supra note 145, at 29; see also EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 124 (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_non_discri_law_ENG_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELR4YXK5] (“In order to raise a presumption of indirect discrimination, a claimant may need to rely on
statistical data that proves general patterns of differential treatment.”).
159. See UNICEF, supra note 4, at 39.
160. Feryn, Judgment, supra note 140, ¶¶ 2–3.
161. Id. ¶ 30.
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The Belov case arose on a request by a Bulgarian body for a preliminary
ruling clarifying several of the Directive’s provisions.162 The situation that
prompted the request involved the placement of electricity meters at 7 meters
in height (23 feet) in two majority Roma districts in the Bulgarian city of
Montana in response to concerns regarding fraud and abuse of the electricity
supply. The customary height for electricity meters elsewhere was 1.7 meters
(5.5 feet), allowing customers to check their electricity usage.163 The
question facing the Court was whether the abnormal placement of the meters
constituted discrimination based on ethnic origin. Mr. Belov, a Roma
resident in one of the two districts, brought the complaint before the
Commission for Protection against Discrimination (“KZD”), a body
established as part of Bulgaria’s transposition of the Race Equality Directive
into its national law.164
The CJEU has interpretive jurisdiction to answer questions on the
application of EU law when posed by national courts or tribunals. The
questions submitted by the KZD in Belov were insightful and responses by
the CJEU would have clarified numerous points concerning the
interpretation of the Race Equality Directive; particularly regarding the
interpretation of “less favorable treatment” in relation to direct
discrimination under Article 2(2)(a) and the meaning of “indirect
discrimination” as defined in Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive.165 As is typical
in cases of first impression, the Court decided an opinion from the Advocate
General was needed. Advocate General Juliane Kokott, provided a wellreasoned opinion in September 2012. The Bulgarian referring body, KZD,
took its mandate from the European Union under Article 13 of the Race
Equality Directive and was tasked with defending the rights of those facing
discrimination. In her opinion, as a threshold matter before addressing
several legal questions, Kokott determined that the body was in fact a court
or tribunal with authority to refer questions for a preliminary ruling.166
Among AG Kokott’s findings, she recognized that contrary to how the
Directive had been transposed into Bulgarian law, less favorable treatment
did not exist only where rights or interests defined in law were infringed

162. Belov, AG Opinion, supra note 133, ¶ 1; Belov, Judgment, supra note 141, ¶ 1.
163. Belov, AG Opinion, supra note 133, ¶ 2.
164. Id. ¶¶ 14, 19.
165. Id. ¶ 21.
166. These include “whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its
jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and
whether it is independent. Furthermore, national bodies may refer a question to the Court only if there is
a case pending before them and if they are called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead
to a decision of a judicial nature.” Id. ¶ 26.
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directly or indirectly.167 Neither direct nor indirect discrimination under the
Race Equality Directive requires an infringement of rights or interests
defined in law. The only requirement for the existence of direct or indirect
discrimination is that there be less favorable treatment or a disadvantage.168
If national laws are contrary to the prohibition of discrimination as
established at the EU level, national courts are obliged not to apply such
laws.169
Specifically in relation to the facts in Belov, AG Kokott found no direct
discrimination since the installment of the electricity meters affected
consumers primarily by way of their residential location rather than their
ethnicity.170 However, since the affected districts were inhabited primarily
by Roma, the installation of the electricity meters disproportionately affected
the Roma, resulting in a prima facie case of indirect discrimination based on
ethnic origin.171 Under Article 2(2)(b) of the Race Equality Directive,
Advocate General Kokott clarified that indirect discrimination can be legal
“if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving
that aim are appropriate and necessary,” or “proportionate.”172 However,
even if the measures are justified by a legitimate aim and the means are
appropriate and necessary, the principle of proportionality is violated if they
have undue adverse effects on the residents of the districts.173 Kokott
concluded that measures like the meter installations at issue could be
justified only if they prevented fraud and abuse, provided that there were “no
other, equally suitable measures” that could be taken “to achieve those aims
at a financially reasonable cost, which would have less detrimental effects”
on the local population.174 Additionally, the measure must not result in undue
adverse effects on the residents of the districts in question.175
In January 2013, the CJEU issued its judgment in Belov, ignoring the
Advocate General’s opinion and finding that the body that referred the
question to the Court was not sufficiently of a judicial nature to qualify as a
national court.176 As such, the CJEU dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. This result was considered disappointing, since the CJEU side-

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. ¶¶ 69–73.
Id. ¶¶ 71, 83.
Id. ¶ 83.
Id. ¶ 97.
Id. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶ 100.
Id. ¶ 117.
Id. ¶ 124.
Id.
Belov, Judgment, supra note 141, ¶ 54.
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stepped an opportunity to clarify important points regarding interpretation of
the Race Equality Directive. By dismissing the case on technical grounds,
the Court avoided ruling on key issues of racial discrimination under the
Race Equality Directive.
The most recent CJEU case to address the Race Equality Directive was
CHEZ RB.177 CHEZ RB involved another request for a preliminary ruling
concerning a very similar factual scenario to Belov; the installation of
electricity meters at inaccessible heights in a primarily Roma district in the
Bulgarian town of Dupnitsa.178 The plaintiff in the case, Anelia Georgieva
Nikolova, was a non-Roma owner of a small shop in the Roma district of
Dupnitsa.179 One question raised by the case, therefore, was whether it was
possible for non-members of a particular ethnic group to suffer
discrimination by association.180 In her March 2015 opinion, Advocate
General Kokott referenced her opinion in Belov, noting that CHEZ RB
allowed her an opportunity to delineate more clearly the difference between
direct and indirect discrimination based on ethnic origin.181 In her written
opinion, Kokott drew an analogy between the plaintiff and a group of
individuals who are denied a lunch table because of one group member’s
race.182 According to Kokott, this situation would qualify not only as
discrimination against the individual member, but also against the other
group members who suffer discrimination by association, since none of the
group end up being served.183
Without a preliminary issue allowing for dismissal on technical
grounds—as in Belov—the Court in CHEZ RB openly addressed the question
of discrimination under the Race Equality Directive. The Court referred to
ECtHR jurisprudence in discussing the European conception of ethnicity and
found that Roma origin qualified as an established ethnicity.184 In relation to
Ms. Nikolova’s position, the Court agreed with Advocate General Kokott’s
opinion and held that discrimination under the Race Equality Directive can
extend to individuals who, “although not themselves a member of the race
or ethnic group concerned, nevertheless suffer less favourable treatment or a

177. CHEZ RB, Judgment, supra note 141; Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v.
Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ECLI:EU:C:2015:170
(2015), ¶ 2 [hereinafter CHEZ RB, AG Opinion].
178. CHEZ RB, Judgment, supra note 141, ¶¶ 19–22.
179. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
180. See CHEZ RB, AG Opinion, supra note 177, ¶ 4.
181. Id.
182. Id. ¶ 59.
183. Id.
184. CHEZ RB, Judgment, supra note 141, ¶ 46.
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particular disadvantage on one of [the grounds enumerated in Article 1].”185
In other words, although Ms. Nikolova was not Roma, she was affected by
the placement of the electricity meters in a primarily Roma district, such that
she also suffered from less favorable treatment.
Building on Kokott’s opinion, the CJEU also held that national
provisions which limit the scope of “less favorable treatment” or a
“particular disadvantage,” as referred to in Articles 2(2)(a) and 2(2)(b), to
only those acts that prejudice a “right” or a “legitimate interest” of a person,
ultimately restrict the scope of the protections the Directive is meant to
guarantee.186
In addressing requests for preliminary rulings, the CJEU is limited to
interpreting EU Treaties and EU law. While it can interpret EU law for the
benefit of national courts, it cannot issue a definitive ruling on whether
particular actions violate EU law.187 The CJEU issued a judgment in July
2015 recognizing the possibility of a finding of direct discrimination, but it
ultimately left a final determination up to the Bulgarian court. CHEZ RB
clarified the scope of the Race Equality Directive and was the first ruling
under the Directive to address Roma discrimination. By holding that the
Directive applied to discrimination by association, the CJEU adopted an
inclusive interpretation of discrimination, and paved the way for future
challenges to anti-Roma discrimination. The limitations of the CJEU’s
rulings, however, rest with the Court’s limited to effect change unless
infringement proceedings are brought before it under Articles 258 and 259
of the TFEU, as discussed below. National courts, who make requests for
preliminary rulings, have ultimate authority to determine if discrimination
exists, in fact. With regards to school segregation, the finding by the CJEU
that discrimination by association is subject to redress under the Race
Equality Directive as a violation of a fundamental right does not provide
meaningful protection for Roma children, since their segregation results in
situations where it is precisely that association that they lack. In that respect,
cases of segregation are more straightforward findings of discrimination.
The precedent set by the CJEU in CHEZ RB illustrates that if discrimination
can be found in a more attenuated situation, then school segregation may also
qualify as discrimination.
CHEZ RB represents a milestone in CJEU jurisprudence relating to the
Race Equality Directive. After Belov’s emphasis on procedural issue, CHEZ
RB offered the CJEU an opportunity to interpret the Race Equality Directive
185.
186.
187.

Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶¶ 68–69.
Id. ¶ 71.
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and address difficult questions relating to direct and indirect discrimination.
CHEZ RB could open the door for more cases involving discrimination
against the Roma, but either national courts must be willing to refer such
questions, and the European Commission or another EU Member State must
be willing to initiate infringement proceedings against countries
discriminating against the Roma.
Infringement proceedings allow the European Union to take action
against Member States that violate EU law. As previously mentioned, Article
258 of the TFEU addresses infringement procedures. The Article allows the
European Commission to issue an opinion on a Member State’s failure to
fulfill obligations under the EU treaties before bringing the matter before the
CJEU, should the Member State not comply with the opinion.188 Article 259
allows Member States to bring matters regarding other Member States’
infringement of treaty obligations before the Commission, with the
possibility of later bringing such matters before the CJEU.189 Articles 258
and 259 may arguably be the most effective supranational tools available to
combat segregation at the national level.
In September 2014, the European Commission initiated infringement
proceedings under Article 258 of the TFEU against the Czech Republic for
violating EU anti-discrimination law by segregating Roma children into
special education schools.190 The Commission took similar action against
Slovakia in April 2015.191 The European Commission initiated infringement
proceedings against Hungary in May 2016 to address the continued
segregation of Roma children in Hungarian schools.192 These represent the
first cases in which the European Commission has taken EU Member States
to task for failing to meet their obligations under EU anti-discrimination law.
In response to these proceedings, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia
proposed measures to address the discrimination of Roma students; primarily
as a means of forestalling further action by the European Commission. The
Czech Republic adopted several amendments to their education law,
including an amendment introducing one year of compulsory pre-school
188. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 258, 2008
O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
189. TFEU, art. 259.
190. Press Release, European Roma Rights Centre, Commission Takes Tougher Stance on Member
States Discriminating Roma (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.errc.org/article/commission-takes-tougherstance-on-member-states-discriminating-roma/4359 [https://perma.cc/5JNB-FC7G].
191. Id.
192. Press Release, Amnesty International, EU Commission Probe Must Spell the End of Romani
Segregation in Hungarian Schools (May 26, 2016), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/eucommission-probe-must-spell-the-end-of-romani-segregation-in-hungarian-schools [https://perma.cc/C2
4Z-G28R].
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education.193 The country is also considering eliminating educational
programs for students with mild learning disabilities.194 These measures
suggest that the Czech Republic may finally be taking the educational
segregation of Roma children seriously and adopting substantive measures
to combat it. The Slovak Parliament passed an amendment to their education
law in June 2015 which purports to promote integration and provides
financial incentives to schools educating students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. However, the amendment fails to eliminate ethnic
discrimination against the Roma.195 In contrast to the Czech measures, the
Slovak measures arguably do little more than pay lip service to the
requirements of EU anti-discrimination law. To date, the European
Commission has taken no further action regarding either Slovakia or the
Czech Republic.
The steps taken by the Czech Republic and Slovakia to amend their
laws do not necessarily guarantee the countries’ compliance with EU antidiscrimination law. The European Commission has discretion to continue its
proceedings and engage in further fact finding if it determines measures
implemented by EU Member States are inadequate. In Article 258
proceedings, if the Commission uncovers an infringement it may then bring
the case before the CJEU. The CJEU cannot itself initiate proceedings, and
it is up to the European Commission to work with the CJEU to make sure
violations of the Directive by EU Member States are properly dealt with.
These proceedings suggest that the European Union is taking a more
proactive role in condemning Roma discrimination. However, the European
Commission’s newfound willingness to initiate infringement proceedings
against Member States may be more a product of interest convergence than
of a genuine belief in the necessity of eliminating discrimination against the
Roma. The European Commission’s reaction to Slovakia’s new law,
referenced above, will be instructive in this regard.
Despite its jurisprudential influence, the CJEU, while best situated to
provide judicial opinions on the implementation of anti-discrimination
provisions under the Race Equality Directive, is ill-equipped to adjudicate
human rights cases. As Gráinne de Búrca argues, with the increase in rightsbased arguments before the CJEU, “[t]he self-referential, formulaic and
often minimal style of the single collegiate judgment seems increasingly ill-

193. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT: CZECH REPUBLIC 2015/2016 135 (Mar. 2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/czech-republic/report-czech-republic/
[https://perma.cc/CK53-SEWX].
194. Id.
195. Id. at 322.

ELIASON - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

226

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/3/2017 1:46 PM

[Vol 27:191

suited to the changing circumstances and docket of the Court.”196 Combined
with the limited avenues by which cases may reach the CJEU, this means
that even if motivated by a desire to change the face of discrimination against
the Roma throughout Europe, CJEU judges are limited by the level of
activism of the European Commission and the willingness of national courts
to place themselves before the CJEU. Despite these limitations, the CJEU’s
judgment in CHEZ RB offers hope for future cases involving Roma that
reach the Court, since the Court appears willing to interpret discrimination
in a manner that offers victims meaningful protection.
D. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the
Segregation of Roma Children
While the CJEU has limited jurisprudence addressing issues of racial
discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has heard numerous
cases involving discrimination against the Roma, both in education and in
other areas such as police brutality. The ECtHR is an international court
established by the Council of Europe under the auspices of the European
Convention on Human Rights that deals specifically with human rights
violations.197 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has interpreted direct and
indirect discrimination in a similar fashion to the jurisprudence of the CJEU,
although the European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly
address the difference between direct and indirect discrimination, unlike the
Gender Equality and Race Equality Directives. Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights prohibits discrimination on any ground,
including “sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth
or other status.”198 Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights recognizes education as a fundamental right, stating that
“[n]o person shall be denied the right to education.199 Segregation cases have
been brought under Article 14 of the Convention read together with Article
2 of Protocol No. 1.
There have been six ECtHR judgments to date dealing with the
segregation of Roma children: D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic;
Sampanis and Others v. Greece; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia; Sampani and
Others v. Greece; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary; and Lavida and Others v.
196. Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as Human
Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. 168, 184 (2013).
197. The European Court of Human Rights has forty-seven member states.
198. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, art. 14 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
199. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 198, protocol 1, art. 2.
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Greece. With the exception of D.H. and Others and Oršuš and Others v.
Croatia, which were ultimately decided by the Grand Chamber in its
appellate capacity, each of the decisions above were decided unanimously in
favor of the Roma students; each time without a subsequent appeal.200 In
D.H. and Others and Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, the ECtHR found in favor
of the Roma students on appeal. However, in each case the ECtHR ultimately
failed to order substantive relief. The seminal Roma school segregation
ECtHR case, D.H. and Others,201 has been compared to Brown v. Board of
Education by scholars and activists alike. While Brown had nationwide
impact, the judgment in D.H. and Others dealt exclusively with segregation
in the Czech Republic, limiting the wider impact of the ECtHR’s judgment.
In D.H. and Others, the plaintiffs were eighteen Roma school children
who had been placed in special needs schools in the Czech Republic. In the
region where the plaintiffs lived, only 1.8% of non-Roma students had been
placed in special schools, compared to 50.3% of Roma students.202 After
their placement in the schools, the majority of the plaintiffs requested that
the administrative placement decisions be reviewed, on the basis that their
intellectual capabilities had been improperly tested and they had been
unaware of the consequences of consenting to placement in the special needs
schools.203 Twelve of the plaintiffs lodged constitutional appeals before the
highest Czech court, the Constitutional Court, and argued that the placement
of Roma children in special needs schools amounted to de facto racial
segregation since two separate educational systems existed—normal schools
for the white majority and special schools for the Roma.204
Unlike in Brown, where the constitutional permissibility of segregation
was challenged, in D.H. and Others the question was not whether
segregation was permissible (it clearly was not), but whether segregation was
present given that Roma students were being placed in special schools at
much higher rates than their non-Roma peers.205 However, in other respects,
Brown and D.H. and Others share many similarities. In both cases, the
plaintiffs were representatives of their larger groups, since their experiences
200. LILLA FARKAS, EUROPEAN NETWORK OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE NON-DISCRIMINATION
FIELD, REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION OF ROMA CHILDREN IN EDUCATION 27 (2014). D.H. and Others was
decided in 2007; Sampanis and Others in 2008, Oršuš and Others in 2010, Sampani and Others in 2012
and Horváth and Kiss in 2013.
201. D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) [hereinafter
D.H. and Others, Grand Chamber Judgment].
202. Id. ¶ 18.
203. D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Feb. 7, 2006), ¶ 13
[hereinafter D.H. and Others, Judgment].
204. Id. ¶ 25.
205. Greenberg, supra note 37, at 940–41.
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were collective, rather than individualized. In addressing the segregation of
the Roma students, the Grand Chamber took an unusual approach and opted
not to look at each student’s case individually. Instead, the Grand Chamber
found that the disproportionate placement of Roma students into special
schools amounted to racial discrimination against the students
collectively.206
As with Brown, D.H. and Others had little immediate impact and Roma
students continue to be segregated despite legislative enactments by the
Czech Republic aimed at abolishing special schools.207 Without a subsequent
decision like Brown II in 1955 speaking directly to practical implementation,
the ruling in D.H. and Others has largely been symbolic. Particularly
troubling were the decision’s timeframe and the damages awarded. D.H. and
Others took seven and a half years to be decided and each victim was
awarded a mere €4,000 (approximately $4,500).208 Since no desegregation
order was issued as a result of the case—which would have arguably made
the monetary award a symbolic token of a greater class-based award—the
amount awarded seems pitifully small and insufficient to compensate for a
lifetime of lost potential employment opportunities as a result of unjust
placement into special education schools.
Derrick A. Bell’s argument that Brown was not the product of a strong
commitment to desegregation, but rather a result of interest convergence209
applies equally to D.H. and Others. Subsequent ECtHR case law suggests a
decline in the Court’s support for findings of discrimination in cases
involving educational segregation of the Roma.210 At the same time, the
ECtHR has demonstrated marked unwillingness to find anti-Roma
discrimination outside the context of educational segregation.211 The ECtHR
has a reputation to uphold as a preeminent court of human rights, but also
has to contend with member states with poor human rights records.

206. D.H. and Others, Grand Chamber Judgment, supra note 201, ¶¶ 199–204.
207. Id. ¶ 208.
208. Rostas, supra note 143, at 106.
209. Bell, supra note 55, at 524 (arguing that the value of the Brown decision to whites wasn’t just
the value to those whites who were worried about the immorality of racial inequality, but the value to
those in power who could see the economic and political advances that would occur as a result of
desegregation).
210. See Mathias Möschel, Is the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on Anti-Roma
Violence ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479, 496 (2012) (noting that the Grand
Chamber majority on the finding that there was an Article 14 violation dwindled from 13-4 in D.H. and
Others to 9-8 in Oršuš and Others).
211. Id. at 485 (Möschel notes that the ECtHR has been willing to find Article 2 and 3 violations,
but rarely Article 14 discrimination violations, even when brought in conjunction with cases involving
violence against Roma).
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Furthermore, European support for worldwide human rights initiatives
stands in sharp contrast to its handling of discrimination within its own
borders. With D.H. and Others, the ECtHR attracted substantial positive
press coverage, and Roma activists hailed the decision as a significant step
forward for Roma rights. The ECtHR lacks enforcement capabilities to lend
real weight to its decisions, however, and the Roma students’ “victory” in
D.H. and Others was largely pyrrhic.
Sampanis and Others v. Greece was the second school segregation case
involving Roma children decided by the ECtHR. In Sampanis, Roma
students in Greece were repeatedly refused entry to a local primary school
by non-Roma parents who physically blocked the Roma students. As a result,
the Roma students were forced to study in a completely separate,
prefabricated annex building created to prepare them for entry into normal
primary school.212 The ECtHR’s judgment built on its jurisprudence
established in D.H. and Others and cemented the position taken by the Grand
Chamber in D.H. and Others; namely, that where a prima facie case of
discrimination is found, the burden of proof shifts from the complainant to
the defendant.213 The Court in Sampanis failed, however, to clarify whether
it viewed the segregation at issue as direct or indirect discrimination.214 Since
the facts of the case suggested that explanations for the separate treatment of
Roma students were post facto explanations on the part of the government to
avoid a finding of segregation, Sampanis arguably provided a clear-cut case
of direct discrimination—where Roma students are separated from nonRoma students purely based on race or ethnicity. However, the Court
emphasized its reversal of the burden of proof, a principle which applies
solely to indirect discrimination.215 Issuing a clear-cut finding of direct
discrimination in would have strengthened the ECtHR’s anti-discrimination
jurisprudence, and would have helped clarify the scope of direct
discrimination both for future ECtHR cases and for cases before the CJEU
addressing discrimination under the Race Equality Directive.
Not long after the judgments in D.H. and Others and Sampanis and
Others, the ECtHR issued a judgment in Oršuš and Others v. Croatia.
Similar to the previous segregation cases, the applicants in Oršuš and Others

212. Affaire Sampanis et Autres c. Grèce (Sampanis and Others v. Greece), App. No. 32526/05 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (June 5, 2008), ¶¶ 18–23 [hereinafter Sampanis and Others, Judgment].
213. Sina van den Bogaert, Roma Segregation in Education: Direct or Indirect Discrimination?: An
Analysis of the Parallels and Differences Between Council Directive 2000/43/EC and Recent ECtHR
Case Law on Roma Educational Matters, 71 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VÖLKERRECHT 721, 736 (2011).
214. Id. at 739.
215. Sampanis and Others, Judgment, ¶¶ 78–79.
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were primary school children who had been segregated into Roma-only
classes, ostensibly to provide them with extra language instruction in
Croatian.216 The Court found no discrimination and distinguished D.H. and
Others on grounds that “placing a disproportionate percentage of children
belonging to a specific ethnic minority in schools for the mentally retarded
bears no comparison with placing Roma children in separate classes on the
ground that they lack adequate knowledge of the Croatian language.”217
Crucially, the Court determined unanimously that the segregation at issue
was based not on ethnicity or race, but rather on adequacy of language
skills.218 Despite the Court’s unsatisfactory judgment, on appeal, a divided
Grand Chamber ultimately found a violation of the prohibition of
discrimination as read together with the right to education. Although the
Roma students attended Roma-only classes on the same premises as other
classes, and while it was not a general policy to automatically place Roma
children into separate schools, the Grand Chamber found indirect
discrimination because Roma children alone were affected by the policy,
resulting in a difference of treatment.219
The most recent ECtHR decision addressing the segregation of Roma
children was Horváth and Kiss. In Horváth and Kiss, two Roma children
were classified as mentally disabled under criteria established by Hungarian
legislation and placed in a Hungarian remedial school.220 The Court
ultimately found in the children’s favor and reiterated the importance of the
ability to make findings of indirect discrimination, particularly in the absence
of discriminatory intent.221 The Court was particularly concerned about the
methodology of IQ testing in the case and found there was a danger that the
tests were culturally biased.222 Since the Hungarian legislation had a
disproportionately prejudicial effect on Roma and there were inadequate
protections in place to prevent the misdiagnosis and misplacement of Roma
applicants, the Court held that the applicants suffered from discriminatory
treatment.223 Ultimately, the Court’s legal analysis reinforced the lines of
reasoning developed in D.H. and Others and subsequent cases.
216. Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, App. No. 15766/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 16, 2010), ¶ 60 [hereinafter
Oršuš and Others, Grand Chamber Judgment] (citing the Constitutional Court dismissal).
217. Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, App. No. 15766/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 17, 2008), ¶ 65 [hereinafter
Oršuš and Others, Judgment].
218. Id. ¶ 66.
219. Oršuš and Others, Grand Chamber Judgment, supra note 216, ¶¶ 152–53.
220. Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 11146/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 29, 2013), ¶ 6 [hereinafter
Horváth and Kiss, Judgment].
221. Id. ¶ 105.
222. Id. ¶ 121.
223. Id. ¶ 128.
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In many ways, the ECtHR has been instrumental in promoting
substantive equality, particularly with regards to the educational segregation
of Roma children.224 The ECtHR in Horváth and Kiss went beyond the
Council of Europe, and required positive action to end discrimination and to
account for structural deficiencies faced by groups historically affected by
discrimination.225 However, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has several
weaknesses. In its jurisprudence surrounding Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and its prohibition of discrimination, cases of
direct as well as indirect discrimination can be objectively justified.226 This
contrasts with the Race Equality Directive, which only allows for the
justification of indirect discrimination. The distinction between direct and
indirect discrimination has also remained unclear in ECtHR jurisprudence,
which is particularly problematic due to the cross-citations between the
CJEU and ECtHR.227 Inconsistencies in the application of standards and in
the interpretation of indirect as compared to direct discrimination only
undermine the great strides the ECtHR has made in addressing issues of
school segregation.
Despite its lack of enforcement power, the ECtHR has a role to play in
ending the segregation of Roma children. The nature of ECtHR decisions, as
judgments of a human rights court, are well-suited to clarifying the legal
aspects surrounding discrimination. ECtHR judgments are relatively long,
detailed, and provide much more insight into the judicial decision making
process than similar judgments by the CJEU. The CJEU has often referenced
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in its judgments; although recently such
references have diminished.228 Alone, the ECtHR is incapable of effecting
change, but its judgments can have considerable impact when combined with
the tools available to the European Commission and the CJEU to enforce
compliance with anti-discrimination laws. The key issue is whether the EU
organs wish to enforce compliance with these judgments. The European
Union has historically given deference to Member States in implementing
final judgments of the ECtHR.229 Given the ECtHR’s unwillingness to
impose substantive relief measures, the European Union must become more
involved for the ECtHR’s judgments to have any meaningful effect.
224. Van den Bogaert, supra note 213, at 727.
225. See Horváth and Kiss, Judgment, supra note 220, ¶ 116 (“[T]he Court considers that the State
has specific positive obligations to avoid the perpetuation of past discrimination or discriminative
practices disguised in allegedly neutral tests.”).
226. Van den Bogaert, supra note 213, at 723.
227. See id. at 723.
228. De Búrca, supra note 196, at 17374.
229. Greenberg, supra note 40, at 945.
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E. National Anti-Discrimination Measures: The Case of Hungary
Discrimination against the Roma primarily occurs at the national level.
Hungary’s methods of addressing cases of discrimination brought before its
courts may prove particularly instructive. The national anti-discrimination
laws of EU Member States, which transpose the provisions of EU antidiscrimination laws—including the Race Equality Directive—into national
law, must fulfill the requirements of the Directive or else the Member State
may face proceedings under Articles 226, 228 or 258 of the TFEU for failure
to fulfill its treaty obligations.230 The laws of each EU Member State are
therefore ostensibly compliant with the requirements of the Race Equality
Directive. In terms of implementation, however, national courts must ensure
that national laws are properly enforced. As such, implementation of the
Directive often varies according to the requirements and peculiarities of
Member States’ domestic legal systems.231
In most Central and Eastern European countries, transposition of the
Race Equality Directive into national law has not resulted in a substantial
body of jurisprudence at the national level; few cases have arisen under the
Directive. Hungary provides an important exception to this trend. As part of
its accession process, Hungary enacted new anti-discrimination legislation
in December 2003 and transposed the Race Equality Directive into
Hungarian law.232 Subsequently, a number of cases were brought before
Hungarian courts challenging the segregation of Roma children.
Even before the enactment of Hungary’s anti-discrimination legislation,
a Hungarian municipal court ruled against a segregated primary school in a
1998 decision.233 The case was brought by fourteen Roma students with the
assistance of the Foundation for Romani Civil Rights, a Hungarian NGO.
The students brought suit after a Hungarian periodical published a 1997
article describing how the Ferenc Pethe Primary School in the Hungarian
town of Tiszavasvári had held separate graduation ceremonies for its Roma
230. TFEU arts. 226, 228, and 258. Article 226 of TFEU allows the European Parliament to
investigate failures to implement EU law, if requested by a quarter of its Members. Article 228 involves
investigation by the Ombudsman. Article 258 provides for an infringement proceeding to be brought by
the Commission, with the potential for the infringement proceeding to go before the CJEU.
231. See Joint Report on the Application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000
Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or
Ethnic Origin (‘Racial Equality Directive’) and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000
Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (‘Employment
Equality Directive’), COM (2014) 2 final, at 4–8 (Jan. 17, 2014).
232. Farkas, supra note 23, at 335.
233. Hungarian Court Rules Against Segregation, EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE (Jan. 5, 1999),
http://www.errc.org/article/hungarian-court-rules-against-segregation/2026 [https://perma.cc/UDJ5-T42
E].
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and non-Roma students.234 This was the first legal challenge in Central and
Eastern Europe to segregation.235 The case progressed through the Hungarian
court system, with the Roma students’ claims succeeding at each stage. The
Hungarian Supreme Court ultimately found violations of the Constitution
and several education and minority-related laws.236 Similarly, in a 2007 case,
the Debrecen Appeals Court in eastern Hungary overruled a lower court
decision, and found that the Hungarian city of Miskolc had continued the
segregation of Roma students in violation of the Race Equality Directive by
integrating seven schools without redrawing catchment areas.237 The case
was successfully litigated by the Chance for Children Foundation, a
Hungarian NGO.
Most recently, however, the Hungarian Supreme Court overturned a
lower court judgment in April 2015 and upheld the legality of an all-Roma
school run by the Greek Catholic church. The Court held that the right to
religious freedom superseded the prohibition of segregation and found that
parents had freely selected the school and thereby exercised their freedom of
religion.238 The primary school, located in a primarily Roma neighborhood
in the Hungarian town of Nyíregyháza, was originally closed in 2007 in an
effort to desegregate the school system, resulting in students being bussed to
other schools in the city.239 As a result of strong opposition to desegregation
from the white majority community, however, the school was reopened in
2011 by the ruling government, which placed it in the hands of the Greek
Catholic church. In 2014, a lower court found that the reopened school
violated both Hungarian law on equal opportunity and recommendations of
the Council of Europe.240 The court subsequently ordered the school to stop
234. Roma Sue School in Northeastern Hungary: The Submission Against the Principal of the
Ference Pethe Primary School, Tiszavasvári, Hungary, EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE (May 15,
1998), http://www.errc.org/article/roma-sue-school-in-northeastern-hungary-the-submission-against-the
-principalof-the-ferenc-pethe-primary-school-tiszavasvari-hungary/1807 [https://perma.cc/8T6X-YP7
T].
235. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS: ROMA SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 21 (2016), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/strategic-litigati
on-impacts-roma-school-desegration-20160407.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HW7-ZP3J].
236. O’NIONS, supra note 6, at 15657.
237. Legal Victory in Hungarian Roma School Segregation Case, EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS
CENTRE (May 18, 2007), http://www.errc.org/article/legal-victory-in-hungarian-roma-school-segregatio
n-case/2777 [https://perma.cc/68SP-B9DM].
238. Eszter Neuberger, Hungary’s Highest Court Legitimizes Segregation in the Case of Religious
Schooling, THE BUDAPEST BEACON (Apr. 23, 2015), http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/hungaryshighest-court-legitimizes-segregation-in-the-case-of-religious-schooling/22387 [https://perma.cc/LL6PZRLP].
239. Nick Thorpe, Hungary Court Orders School Closure over Roma Segregation, BBC NEWS (Feb.
28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26390357 [https://perma.cc/GT3A-9PUF].
240. Id.
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admitting new students.241 The same church ran a new school in the center
of the city with much better amenities. When asked by the judge during the
hearing if the Roma students could be accommodated in the newer, larger
school, one of the priests replied that perhaps they could make room in the
attic.242 One of the issues with the reopening of the school was that in the
absence of free buses to take children to other schools, the cost of public
transportation effectively limited the options of Roma children in that
neighborhood to the school in question, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy
of the freedom of choice argument embraced by the Supreme Court.243 This
decision marked a blow for desegregation in Hungary.
One primary obstacle facing NGOs that wish to bring cases challenging
rights violations is the task of finding plaintiffs willing to subject themselves
to lengthy and intrusive legal processes. The Chance For Children
Foundation has litigated the majority of Hungary’s school segregation cases
and has worked together on numerous matters with the European Roma
Rights Centre—the leading public interest legal organization handling Roma
rights in Europe. The key tool used by the Chance For Children Foundation
is its ability under the Hungarian Constitution to bring an actio popularis in
the interest of public order. This designation ultimately allows NGOs to
bring cases without the need to provide specific plaintiffs. Several of the
Foundation’s key cases before Hungarian courts were brought in this
manner. The larger volume of cases involving Roma discrimination brought
before Hungarian courts—as compared to lesser volumes in other Central
and Eastern European countries—is attributable, at least in part, to the
existence of actio popularis under Hungarian law. However, the
controversial 2011 revision to the Hungarian Constitution restricted actio
popularis and limited the ability of NGOs to appeal cases advocating for
Roma rights in the absence of affected plaintiffs.244 In 2013, the Hungarian
Constitutional Court ruled that only natural and legal persons with a direct
interest in an actual case could file a constitutional complaint against a court

241. Id.
242. Jeneen Interlandi, The Brain’s Empathy Gap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/magazine/the-brains-empathy-gap.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YZ
3F-WSR3].
243. See The Nyíregyháza Resegregation Case, CHANCE FOR CHILDREN FOUNDATION (2015),
http://www.cfcf.hu/en/ny%C3%ADregyh%C3%A1za-resegregation-case [https://perma.cc/ZR78-JYV
9].
244. See Katalin Kelemen, Access to Constitutional Justice in the New Hungarian Constitutional
Framework: Life after the Actio Popularis?, in LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: NEW
PERSPECTIVES FROM LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 63, 65 (Antonia Geisler, Michael Hein & Siri
Hummel eds., 2014).
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decision.245 This effectively undermined the constitutional protection against
discriminatory practices.246
Facially, the European Union appears to offer a variety of protections
against discrimination, with directives pertaining to gender,247 race248 and
disability,249 among others. However, despite a gradual shift toward
upholding fundamental rights, the European Union remains primarily
focused on market access. Ultimately, even where the mandate is ostensibly
broader, such as with the Race Equality Directive, anti-discrimination
measures are primarily invoked to facilitate employment and commerce, and
not to address systemic racism. While the European Union’s directives
contain within them the seeds of genuine anti-discriminatory potential, they
are inadequate as practically implemented to remedy non-economic-based
racism.
In everyday life, visible minorities in Europe continue to experience
routine acts of ‘petty racism’ which, as Möschel notes, “are judicially
trivialised and dismissed or interpreted as reactions of over-sensitive
individuals.”250 Ultimately, both the Race Equality Directive and national
anti-discrimination laws as currently implemented reflect a focus on the
perpetrator perspective rather than the victim perspective, as the condition of
victims is considered of lesser importance than the elimination of identified
violations.251 This emphasis is unsurprising, since critical race theory
predicts such a result in systems like those in the United States and the
European Union.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD – SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ADDRESSING ROMA SEGREGATION IN
EUROPE
Discrimination against the Roma is widespread throughout Europe.
Europeans who would likely be appalled by racist language targeting Asians
and Africans will casually use pejorative terms when talking about Roma.

245. András Kádár, Constitutional Court Denies Legal Standing of NGO’s in Actio Popularis Cases,
EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW NETWORK (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.equalitylaw.eu/component/edocman/
?task=document.viewdoc&id=1588&Itemid [https://perma.cc/44F3-79XW] (citing the Hungarian
Constitutional Court decision no. IV/03311/2012 (delivered on June 17, 2013)).
246. Id.
247. Gender Equality Directive, supra note 138.
248. Race Equality Directive, supra note 120.
249. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
250. MÖSCHEL, supra note 49, at 135.
251. See id. at 137.
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As the Roma rights scholar and activist James Goldston notes, “[t]he
stereotypes about Gypsies are so insidious that even some leading human
rights activists share the tendency to minimize the extent of Roma
mistreatment, to react defensively when their national governments are
criticized for their Roma policies, or to blame the Roma for their own
troubles.”252 While Europe’s climate of casual racism makes the struggle for
equality more challenging than it might be otherwise, it does not mean that
there are no steps that can be taken toward eliminating the segregation of
Roma children. In this section, I propose three measures with the potential
to address the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the current legal regime.
The following suggestions do not offer an absolute remedy, nor are they
guaranteed to be effective. However, taken together, they have potential to
counter some of the systemic forces hindering desegregation. The three
suggestions that follow represent a combination of approaches—namely, a
top-down approach; a bottom-up approach; and external international
pressure.
The first suggestion emphasizes a bottom-up approach to addressing
segregation. At the grassroots level, lawyers must bring more legal
challenges to school segregation before national courts throughout Central
and Eastern Europe. While Hungary has demonstrated success with public
interest impact litigation, too few lawyers are involved in this type of work
and far too few challenges have been brought before national courts. Without
cases initiated before national courts, the potential for social transformation
will remain limited; particularly where political action and policies aimed at
social change have been ineffective. Without active litigation by grassroots
organizations and domestic lawyers, the CJEU and the European
Commission remain handcuffed in their ability to effect social change. Even
if cases are dismissed by national courts, the mere act of bringing them can
garner national and international attention; as has been the case with school
segregation cases. Active grassroots involvement of attorneys and NGOs is
arguably the most important element to the elimination of school segregation
against the Roma.
There are challenges to a grassroots approach. James Goldston argues
that rather than demonstrating that law can be a tool for reform, one effect of
repeated situations where landmark Roma rights decisions lead to continued
segregation and police abuse “may be to devalue law by revealing its
powerlessness.”253 This argument underestimates the power of litigation as

252. James A. Goldston, Roma Rights, Roma Wrongs, in EASTERN EUROPEAN ROMA IN THE EU:
MOBILITY, DISCRIMINATION, SOLUTIONS 14, 14 (Anca Pusca ed., 2012).
253. Goldston, supra note 22, at 312.
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an instrument of gradual change and ignores the success that impact
litigation has had in the United States under similar circumstances in
bringing awareness to ongoing issues of discrimination. There are certainly
barriers to public interest litigation that must be overcome,254 and the
outcome of litigation may not result in immediate change. Yet public interest
litigation arguably represents the most powerful tool for achieving equality
between Roma and non-Roma. By using individual cases to bring attention
to the systemic issues and to the general situation of Roma children, impact
litigation can exert broad influence on social policy. In support of a
grassroots approach, Goldston notes that process-based arguments have been
particularly successful, as have cases built around evidence of systemic
problems.255
Organizations like the European Roma Rights Centre and the
Hungarian Chance for Children Foundation have proven instrumental in
bringing cases of anti-Roma discrimination before national courts. One
challenge such organizations face is finding plaintiffs willing to litigate their
claims; particularly given Roma mistrust of the legal system and of
government generally. Most European litigators who accept Roma rights
cases are non-Roma, since few Roma are sufficiently enfranchised to hold
law degrees. Given that the issue at hand involves school segregation, it is
unsurprising that decades of Roma segregation have resulted in there being
far fewer Roma lawyers than necessary to create a Roma-driven grassroots
impact litigation movement. As part of the effort to increase Roma
participation in education, activists should emphasize the importance of
lawyers and the legal profession in promoting change. High profile instances
of impact litigation may help shift Roma perceptions and assuage fears
concerning involvement with national court systems.
In the United States, impact litigation has played an important role in
advancing civil rights. It has provided minorities a voice in the legal process
where they would otherwise have remained silenced. Even where
unsuccessful, many cases brought across the United States—particularly in
the South—attracted public attention, influenced public discourse, and cast
issues of segregation into the national spotlight.
The second suggestion is for greater involvement by the CJEU and the
European Commission in ensuring that the provisions of the Race Equality
Directive are enforced. Legislative measures will only prove effective if
those responsible for implementing such measures cooperate, and such
cooperation is unlikely to occur voluntarily. Without a strong ‘federal’
254.
255.

See id. at 317 (laying out the barriers to effective public interest litigation).
Id. at 317, 320, 321–22, 323.
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government to impose top-down measures, the Central European countries,
which resemble the Alabamas and Mississippis of the 1950s and 60s in their
discrimination against Roma, have little incentive to enforce antidiscrimination policies. In much the same way that the United States
Supreme Court was instrumental in forcing desegregation upon the southern
states, so too can the CJEU act as a force in condemning continued
segregation. This top-down approach brings the weight of the European
Union to bear on national courts and governments. While critical race theory
demonstrates that a top-down approach cannot fully eliminate discrimination
and lacks the capacity to change systems that promote discrimination, topdown forces are vital in overcoming intransigence at the national level.
Without top-down pressure, Central and Eastern European countries will
lack the motivation necessary to enact real, impactful changes.
As more cases involving the Race Equality Directive are brought before
the court, the CJEU may be more willing to directly address issues of race
and ethnicity. As CHEZ RB illustrated, the CJEU is open to inclusive
interpretations of discrimination. How the CJEU’s jurisprudence develops
its interpretation in future segregation cases remains to be seen, but there are
avenues of possibility for the CJEU. Legal scholars have also begun to
discuss race in Europe more specifically, and not as part of an abstract and
detached idea of discrimination. These discussions may shift in a positive
direction conversations of policy concerning the Roma.
While the European Union, through infringement proceedings, can hold
Member States accountable for failures to uphold anti-discrimination laws,
it lacks the power to prescribe what Member States can or cannot do with
regards to education. In creating a quasi-federal entity, the European Union
and the United States face similar difficulties in the realm of education; for
instance, the idea of a national curriculum has been widely opposed in the
United States for decades. It remains to be seen if the proceedings initiated
by the European Commission against the Czech Republic and Slovakia will
result in CJEU cases, and if so, whether the CJEU will adopt an interpretation
of indirect discrimination that prevents countries from bypassing legal
mandates by modifying their educational policies in manner that entrenches
educational segregation.
Although DH and Others was a seminal ECtHR case, subsequent
actions by the Czech Republic indicate that without further litigation and
substantive penalties imposed by the European Union, countries such as the
Czech Republic will resist efforts to integrate their schools—much like the
Southern states during the Civil Rights Movement. Until now, almost all
decisions condemning discrimination against the Roma have come from the
ECtHR or from national courts. As Jack Greenberg notes, “[e]ven as courts
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find for the Roma plaintiffs, they fail to enforce effective remedies against
the offending schools.”256 In this respect, perhaps the CJEU may have greater
capacity to effect change, although it would be naïve to think that the Court
can offer a panacea for Europe’s race issues, given its traditional market
access-focused approach to rights. Critical race theory also suggests that
even if the CJEU successfully forced desegregation upon EU Member States,
its efforts would likely be undermined by continuing racism and subsequent
interest divergence—as seen in the United States post-Brown. Nevertheless,
the CJEU will remain instrumental in the continued development and
enforcement of EU anti-discrimination law, and it is imperative that a
Brown-type decision emerge not only from the ECtHR, but also from the
CJEU, which holds greater legal influence over EU Member States.
Some may argue that with EU Member States increasingly skeptical of
European Union involvement in their national affairs, it is an inopportune
time to advocate for greater European Union involvement in issues of
discrimination and social injustice. However, if such involvement does not
occur, the European Union will remain a fragmented body where some
Member States take their obligations more seriously than others. A slippery
slope exists between selective enforcement of human rights and widespread
selectivity in the enforcement of other fundamental freedoms that relate to
the very origins of the European Union. The CJEU and the European
Commission are essential to the fight against discrimination and segregation
in Europe.
Finally, the third and complementary suggestion is to attract greater
international attention to the plight of the Roma. Heightened global
awareness will force the European Union and its Member States to respond
to international criticism. International pressure played a role in forcing the
United States Government to address segregation in the 1950s and 60s,257
and similar pressure can be brought to bear against Europe. The United
Nations has acknowledged the discrimination facing the Roma, but has
stopped short of condemning European inaction. The United States
maintained observer status as part of the Decade of Roma Inclusion,
suggesting that it has an interest in the effective resolution of Roma
discrimination. Now, the United States must take action to advocate
aggressively for the elimination of segregation and the removal of barriers
to Roma integration throughout Europe. Ultimately, the United States has an
opportunity, at a time when it is facing its own significant challenges with

256. Greenberg, supra note 40, at 938.
257. See generally, e.g., Azza Salama Layton, International Pressure and the U.S. Government’s
Response to Little Rock, 66 ARK. HIST. Q. 243 (2007).
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racial issues, to demonstrate a commitment to racial equality, both at home
and abroad. Only by upholding principles of equality and justice for all can
the international community continue to improve global human rights.
In a time when countries increasingly eschew global human rights in
favor of domestic isolationist concerns, it is particularly imperative that
supposed beacons of freedom and democracy be held to task for their
failings. This applies to Europe as much as to the United States, and the
treatment of the Roma is illustrative of Europe’s failure to adhere to the
values that EU Member States have supposedly committed to uphold. Now,
more than ever, the international community must pressure the European
Union to take action to eliminate segregation.
These are by no means easy fixes, and a great deal of individual effort
and political will is required for these measures to be successful. In today’s
political climate, the fight to end Roma discrimination will likely be an uphill
battle with no simple solution. Acknowledging the role that race plays and
the need for legal measures that provide race-based protections is an
important starting point. The key is to recognize that participation across all
jurisprudential levels is necessary for success, and for systemic changes to
occur, bottom-up impact litigation must drive top-down enforcement of
existing rules that so far have been sporadically implemented and enforced.
CONCLUSION
For Europe to advance as a society, the Roma must achieve justice and
equality. That such a large minority has suffered from discrimination for so
long in one of the most developed and supposedly enlightened parts of the
world without significant backlash from the international community
beggars belief. With every generation of children that continues to suffer
school segregation, discriminatory attitudes toward the Roma become
further entrenched and opportunities for inclusion of the Roma in European
society slip increasingly out of reach.
Critical race theory helps explain why legislative and policy initiatives
have yet to eliminate the segregation of Roma children in schools, despite
the comprehensive nature of existing legal protections. So long as white
majorities in EU Member States—and particularly those in Central Europe—
refuse to accept desegregation, ensuring proper enforcement of the Roma’s
legal rights will remain an uphill battle. Impact litigation is perhaps the most
important component of the fight against segregation in Europe. Such
litigation increases international awareness of matters involving social
injustice—even where national governments would rather brush them under
the rug. Impact litigation can also lead to infringement proceedings initiated
by the European Union and significant penalties can be levied if the
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enforcement of anti-discrimination laws continues to be lax. Increased
international scrutiny may also attract localized funding to assist NGOs in
driving impact litigation.
In light of today’s political climate, it would be overly optimistic to
believe that systemic change is likely to occur in the next few years.
However, if the Civil Rights Movement had given up in light of its failures
in the United States, legalized segregation would likely still persist in the
United States. Until Europe recognizes Roma equality—both substantively
and legally—it will lack credibility as a leader among the international
human rights community. In this respect, Roma children must not only be
integrated into white majority schools, but white majorities must also be
educated about Roma equality. Only through education will the hearts and
minds of white majority Europeans be changed.

